https://www.yahoo.com/news/eu-not-supply...19892.html
No big surprise. The EU is basically incapable of doing anything in a reasonable time. The US is bad, but the EU makes us look like speed merchants. God forbid NATO actually has to fight a "long" conventional war. One would hope the immediacy of the Russian threat would make the EU not function "business as usual". Not the case.
https://www.eurotopics.net/en/310100/ukr...ive-failed
Ukraine is still "advancing" in areas of opportunity, like the Kherson Oblast. Right now, the "muddy season" has begun, which limits what is possible. It appears Ukraine intends to keep pressure on the Russians all winter, particularly in logistics. The hope is that the attrition in the Russian ranks will lead to weakness. Russia has supposedly committed 100% of their available troops. There lack of response to multiple bridgeheads in the Kherson Oblast supports that idea.
However, as the article points out, Ukraine's lack of air power has been a big problem. Will the F-16s change that enough to do the job? We shall see. Again, abysmal analysis and planning delayed providing this capability promptly, despite the fact it was clear that without it Ukraine would suffer heavy losses to Russian air while operating offensively. It also was obvious that Ukraine would lack the "deep strike" capability to destroy Russian fixed emplacements.
It is also true that Ukraine is running out of troops. They have improved their mobilization operations, which will undoubtedly yield a larger percentage of eligible young men. This problem is real and cannot be ignored. Ukrainian infantry losses need to be carefully considered in any offensive context.
No big surprise. The EU is basically incapable of doing anything in a reasonable time. The US is bad, but the EU makes us look like speed merchants. God forbid NATO actually has to fight a "long" conventional war. One would hope the immediacy of the Russian threat would make the EU not function "business as usual". Not the case.
https://www.eurotopics.net/en/310100/ukr...ive-failed
Ukraine is still "advancing" in areas of opportunity, like the Kherson Oblast. Right now, the "muddy season" has begun, which limits what is possible. It appears Ukraine intends to keep pressure on the Russians all winter, particularly in logistics. The hope is that the attrition in the Russian ranks will lead to weakness. Russia has supposedly committed 100% of their available troops. There lack of response to multiple bridgeheads in the Kherson Oblast supports that idea.
However, as the article points out, Ukraine's lack of air power has been a big problem. Will the F-16s change that enough to do the job? We shall see. Again, abysmal analysis and planning delayed providing this capability promptly, despite the fact it was clear that without it Ukraine would suffer heavy losses to Russian air while operating offensively. It also was obvious that Ukraine would lack the "deep strike" capability to destroy Russian fixed emplacements.
It is also true that Ukraine is running out of troops. They have improved their mobilization operations, which will undoubtedly yield a larger percentage of eligible young men. This problem is real and cannot be ignored. Ukrainian infantry losses need to be carefully considered in any offensive context.