[Goose]

An interesting article, which if true and accurate, illustrates our propensity to assume that the easy solution will always trump the hard one.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024...necessity/

Hard for me to think that this system was designed with no real thought put into the question of what happens if we can't resupply in port? What use is a guided missile ship if it has no missiles. So now, years after the system was designed, we are trying to figure out how to resupply at sea?
Hard to fathom.

To be fair, LOTS of thought has been put into the question of what happens if we can't resupply in port. This supply question has always existed for ships at sea and still will exist even when the ability to reload missiles at sea is perfected. It is a question of degree. The answer in the past was two-fold.

First, until very recently there has been no ability to target US carrier task forces on the open sea. The carriers would bomb the heck out of the enemy and attrit their ability to launch counter air strikes. The CAP would shoot down any missile launching aircraft that threatened the force at ranges that were "safe". If that failed, the escorts would use their SAMs to destroy any cruise missiles and aircraft that managed to get through. The escorting destroyers were envisioned as defensive weapons, not really part of the "strike". It must be remembered that even today it is very difficult to even FIND a carrier task force to attack it. The ocean is large. Satellites can tell you where the carrier was, not where it is. As a result, the missile load-out was reasonably assumed to last for months, not weeks. There was also no "blue water" force that could  really effectively overwhelm our defenses. The Soviet Union had a navy that basically was designed to have a "punchers chance". It couldn't be ignored, but it was never large enough or capable enough to go "toe-to-toe" with the USN. The USN also had the option of choosing where and when it would attack the Soviet Union. The battlespace was very large.

Second, and probably more importantly to the reload problem, the USN had a +/- 600 ship force. It expected to regularly rotate ships in the escort force. The DDG would be relieved and go back to a somewhat nearby port (Japan, the PI, maybe Australia if you were lucky), get some rest, fix/replace stuff that broke, and come back to the fight when ready. That is always how it was done in the past. This is partly because smaller ships do require periodic maintenance to remain effective. They can refuel at sea from the carrier or a tanker. They can re-provision that way too. However, they can't stay at sea for months on end and remain effective. That is one reason why the US closed in on Japan by capturing many islands. We  wanted ports closer to the target so we could "short cycle" ship repairs/resupply.

What has changed is three things. First, the existence and frequent (prodigious actually) use of TLAMs instead of aircraft has placed what was the "escort force" directly in the "strike" role. They didn't use to be. These strike missiles take up space in the VLS that otherwise be reserved for SAMs and some surface-to-surface anti-shipping missiles. We use a lot of them because we don't want to risk aircraft in heavily defended airspace. This is the main problem. Second, the PLAN has developed the capability to attack US carriers with long range ballistic missiles. This isn't as easy as it sounds because getting an accurate firing solution is still very problematic. However, the carrier can't use it's own aircraft to counter these missiles. They must rely, in the end, on the escort's ABM weapons. There better be enough of them, because the PLAN can launch LOTS of ballistic missiles.

Second, we no longer have a +/- 600 ship navy. Instead, we have +/- 275. The article makes the (dubious IMO) claim that reloading at sea provides the equivalent of 18 more DDGs. In 1990, we had the 18 more DDGs, so we didn't care. The claim is IMO dubious because it omits the requirement to provide a ship to carry the replacement missiles and a safe place in the open sea to do the reload. It can't take place in an area where ballistic missile attack is possible because the UNREP ship would be in danger just getting there. We don't have any "spare" UNREP ships to just do this without creating other, worse problems. The UNREP carry only limited non-fuel supplies. We are even shorter of this capability than we are of DDGs. The example of the current Red Sea operation points out the Carney has been there for four months and didn't run out of missiles. Granted, the Houthi are not exactly China. This is a very long time for a ship of this type to be on "detached service", and probably a port call is going to be required pretty soon. Anyway, this isn't a "typical situation". If Carney needed a missile reload, Jeddah is only about 700 nm away (not 2000 nm, that is Souda Bay/Qatar distance).  I am sure they could reload there if it was absolutely necessary. Not a great liberty port though :-).

Third, what the USN is really worried about is defending Taiwan (or at least making the PLAN think it can and will). That geometry requires the USN to stay relatively close to what it is defending. It is not at all like attacking China would be. It is also in an area where mainland China is lots closer to the objective than any US friendly ports. This proximity would allow China to concentrate their forces to direct a prodigious number of missiles (all types) and aircraft against the US fleet. The ocean is lots smaller if you are tied to Taiwan by a range circle of your own weapons. It is still "big", but not near as big. The USN is going to need lots of combat power just to defend itself. The escorts may be required to use up lots of ordinance very rapidly. Not having to withdraw a large distance to re-arm is in this case very important. However, it must be remembered doing so isn't "free". You can't re-arm in an area where the UNREP ship could be easily sunk getting there. You may also have to escort the UNREP ship, which takes a DDG/Frigate with necessary weapons stocks. The capability to do this is valuable, but not nearly as valuable as it first appears. It is always going to be "slow" and constrain the movements of the vessels involved (as any UNREP does).

[Goose]

An interesting article, which if true and accurate, illustrates our propensity to assume that the easy solution will always trump the hard one.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2024...necessity/

Hard for me to think that this system was designed with no real thought put into the question of what happens if we can't resupply in port? What use is a guided missile ship if it has no missiles. So now, years after the system was designed, we are trying to figure out how to resupply at sea?
Hard to fathom.

To be fair, LOTS of thought has been put into the question of what happens if we can't resupply in port. This supply question has always existed for ships at sea and still will exist even when the ability to reload missiles at sea is perfected. It is a question of degree. The answer in the past was two-fold.

First, until very recently there has been no ability to target US carrier task forces on the open sea. The carriers would bomb the heck out of the enemy and attrit their ability to launch counter air strikes. The CAP would shoot down any missile launching aircraft that threatened the force at ranges that were "safe". If that failed, the escorts would use their SAMs to destroy any cruise missiles and aircraft that managed to get through. The escorting destroyers were envisioned as defensive weapons, not really part of the "strike". It must be remembered that even today it is very difficult to even FIND a carrier task force to attack it. The ocean is large. Satellites can tell you where the carrier was, not where it is. As a result, the missile load-out was reasonably assumed to last for months, not weeks. There was also no "blue water" force that could  really effectively overwhelm our defenses. The Soviet Union had a navy that basically was designed to have a "punchers chance". It couldn't be ignored, but it was never large enough or capable enough to go "toe-to-toe" with the USN. The USN also had the option of choosing where and when it would attack the Soviet Union. The battlespace was very large.

Second, and probably more importantly to the reload problem, the USN had a +/- 600 ship force. It expected to regularly rotate ships in the escort force. The DDG would be relieved and go back to a somewhat nearby port (Japan, the PI, maybe Australia if you were lucky), get some rest, fix/replace stuff that broke, and come back to the fight when ready. That is always how it was done in the past. This is partly because smaller ships do require periodic maintenance to remain effective. They can refuel at sea from the carrier or a tanker. They can re-provision that way too. However, they can't stay at sea for months on end and remain effective. That is one reason why the US closed in on Japan by capturing many islands. We  wanted ports closer to the target so we could "short cycle" ship repairs/resupply.

What has changed is three things. First, the existence and frequent (prodigious actually) use of TLAMs instead of aircraft has placed what was the "escort force" directly in the "strike" role. They didn't use to be. These strike missiles take up space in the VLS that otherwise be reserved for SAMs and some surface-to-surface anti-shipping missiles. We use a lot of them because we don't want to risk aircraft in heavily defended airspace. This is the main problem. Second, the PLAN has developed the capability to attack US carriers with long range ballistic missiles. This isn't as easy as it sounds because getting an accurate firing solution is still very problematic. However, the carrier can't use it's own aircraft to counter these missiles. They must rely, in the end, on the escort's ABM weapons. There better be enough of them, because the PLAN can launch LOTS of ballistic missiles.

Second, we no longer have a +/- 600 ship navy. Instead, we have +/- 275. The article makes the (dubious IMO) claim that reloading at sea provides the equivalent of 18 more DDGs. In 1990, we had the 18 more DDGs, so we didn't care. The claim is IMO dubious because it omits the requirement to provide a ship to carry the replacement missiles and a safe place in the open sea to do the reload. It can't take place in an area where ballistic missile attack is possible because the UNREP ship would be in danger just getting there. We don't have any "spare" UNREP ships to just do this without creating other, worse problems. The UNREP carry only limited non-fuel supplies. We are even shorter of this capability than we are of DDGs. The example of the current Red Sea operation points out the Carney has been there for four months and didn't run out of missiles. Granted, the Houthi are not exactly China. This is a very long time for a ship of this type to be on "detached service", and probably a port call is going to be required pretty soon. Anyway, this isn't a "typical situation". If Carney needed a missile reload, Jeddah is only about 700 nm away (not 2000 nm, that is Souda Bay/Qatar distance).  I am sure they could reload there if it was absolutely necessary. Not a great liberty port though :-).

Third, what the USN is really worried about is defending Taiwan (or at least making the PLAN think it can and will). That geometry requires the USN to stay relatively close to what it is defending. It is not at all like attacking China would be. It is also in an area where mainland China is lots closer to the objective than any US friendly ports. This proximity would allow China to concentrate their forces to direct a prodigious number of missiles (all types) and aircraft against the US fleet. The ocean is lots smaller if you are tied to Taiwan by a range circle of your own weapons. It is still "big", but not near as big. The USN is going to need lots of combat power just to defend itself. The escorts may be required to use up lots of ordinance very rapidly. Not having to withdraw a large distance to re-arm is in this case very important. However, it must be remembered doing so isn't "free". You can't re-arm in an area where the UNREP ship could be easily sunk getting there. You may also have to escort the UNREP ship, which takes a DDG/Frigate with necessary weapons stocks. The capability to do this is valuable, but not nearly as valuable as it first appears. It is always going to be "slow" and constrain the movements of the vessels involved (as any UNREP does).