[Goose]

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

I find all of the articles very interesting, particularly the last one. Naturally, I have some comments :-).

IMO the Rand article regarding blockade is relevant and accurate as far as it goes. If Ukraine can sustain an "effective" blockade around Crimea they can undoubtedly make things difficult for Russia. This activity would be part of any attempt to occupy Crimea by Ukrainian forces. There is more than one way to do that. If the blockade is very effective, it will not simply make the Russians "uncomfortable". It will make the military forces in Crimea untenable and will force their evacuation. That is one outcome. Another one, which I believe to be more within Ukraine's capabilities, is to create a situation where Russia can keep her troops supplied with either food (and water) or bullets, but not both. The severely constrained Russian troops will then be unable to effectively resist a Ukrainian attack. It is obviously better if Russia evacuates on their own, but that IMO is unlikely. They will need to be pushed.

The similarities to Poland are indeed present. Ironically Ukraine voted for independence from the Russian Federation partly because the population believed they would receive US aid along the same lines Poland did. This was despite the fact Bush tried to tell them in his "Chicken Kiev" speech that was not the case. The US simply didn't have the money to do that and Congress wouldn't have approved it if we did.

There are also some important differences. One of them is that Russia is a much more "natural" trading partner with Ukraine than Poland is/ever was. The rivers run mostly north south. There was also in the past synergy with steel production/coal mining in Ukraine (Donbas) using some raw materials from Russia with Russia being the main customer for the finished products. Less important today but still a factor. The ports in Ukraine are also closer to European Russian than the alternatives are and the alternatives are not particularly good ports. The rail links between Russia and Ukraine are also very good, partly because of history, but it is true even today. Both Russia and Ukraine would have been better off if these common interests had allowed them to work together peacefully. Unfortunately, Putin can't allow free movement of goods and people to/from Ukraine because his totalitarian policies would quickly come under challenge.

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The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

The serious problem with the GPS/INS mode of operation in Ukraine is that Russian GPS jammers have rendered precision weapons using GPS either useless or seriously degraded. If it is really true that the Paveways supplied by the UK do not arm in the absence of GPS guidance, they will have a big problem in Ukraine. One of the virtues of the ATACMS is that targets located that far behind the FEBA are not at present protected by GPS jammers. The Paveways would be the same except to get that deep into Russian territory with a weapon of 18 miles range would be quite dangerous. Can be done in many cases, but only with SEAD accompanying the strike.

That is why I hope Ukraine actually has a way to use the laser targeting mode. Otherwise, the Paveways will have the same problem Ukraine has with the JDAM-ERs we already gave them, only worse (18 mile standoff range vs 45). Drone designators were not "a thing" when these weapons were designed, but today it is eminently practical. Ideally, all the stand-off weapons in Ukraine would use imaging infrared target scene matching to recognize the target. This allows the INS to get the weapon "close" and then it can "see" the target and home in on it. Unfortunately that is too new for general use in Ukraine. It also unfortunately has a history of not working nearly as well in practice as advertised. Let's see if the French one does (although we might never actually know). A drone with a laser designator can accomplish the same thing reliably.

[Goose]

Here are some articles from the last year or so discussing this issue directly.

https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraines-co...ake-crimea
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...e-00083857
https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/202...ht-be.html
This link which is in one of the above articles is also well worth a read and some thought
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2...y-00083683

I find all of the articles very interesting, particularly the last one. Naturally, I have some comments :-).

IMO the Rand article regarding blockade is relevant and accurate as far as it goes. If Ukraine can sustain an "effective" blockade around Crimea they can undoubtedly make things difficult for Russia. This activity would be part of any attempt to occupy Crimea by Ukrainian forces. There is more than one way to do that. If the blockade is very effective, it will not simply make the Russians "uncomfortable". It will make the military forces in Crimea untenable and will force their evacuation. That is one outcome. Another one, which I believe to be more within Ukraine's capabilities, is to create a situation where Russia can keep her troops supplied with either food (and water) or bullets, but not both. The severely constrained Russian troops will then be unable to effectively resist a Ukrainian attack. It is obviously better if Russia evacuates on their own, but that IMO is unlikely. They will need to be pushed.

The similarities to Poland are indeed present. Ironically Ukraine voted for independence from the Russian Federation partly because the population believed they would receive US aid along the same lines Poland did. This was despite the fact Bush tried to tell them in his "Chicken Kiev" speech that was not the case. The US simply didn't have the money to do that and Congress wouldn't have approved it if we did.

There are also some important differences. One of them is that Russia is a much more "natural" trading partner with Ukraine than Poland is/ever was. The rivers run mostly north south. There was also in the past synergy with steel production/coal mining in Ukraine (Donbas) using some raw materials from Russia with Russia being the main customer for the finished products. Less important today but still a factor. The ports in Ukraine are also closer to European Russian than the alternatives are and the alternatives are not particularly good ports. The rail links between Russia and Ukraine are also very good, partly because of history, but it is true even today. Both Russia and Ukraine would have been better off if these common interests had allowed them to work together peacefully. Unfortunately, Putin can't allow free movement of goods and people to/from Ukraine because his totalitarian policies would quickly come under challenge.

---

The Paveways are probably not going to be using laser designation very often if at all. More likely they will be using their GPS/IMS guidance similar to the JDAM and AASM bombs they have.

Here's the article I read about them yesterday.

https://www.twz.com/news-features/dual-m...to-ukraine

The serious problem with the GPS/INS mode of operation in Ukraine is that Russian GPS jammers have rendered precision weapons using GPS either useless or seriously degraded. If it is really true that the Paveways supplied by the UK do not arm in the absence of GPS guidance, they will have a big problem in Ukraine. One of the virtues of the ATACMS is that targets located that far behind the FEBA are not at present protected by GPS jammers. The Paveways would be the same except to get that deep into Russian territory with a weapon of 18 miles range would be quite dangerous. Can be done in many cases, but only with SEAD accompanying the strike.

That is why I hope Ukraine actually has a way to use the laser targeting mode. Otherwise, the Paveways will have the same problem Ukraine has with the JDAM-ERs we already gave them, only worse (18 mile standoff range vs 45). Drone designators were not "a thing" when these weapons were designed, but today it is eminently practical. Ideally, all the stand-off weapons in Ukraine would use imaging infrared target scene matching to recognize the target. This allows the INS to get the weapon "close" and then it can "see" the target and home in on it. Unfortunately that is too new for general use in Ukraine. It also unfortunately has a history of not working nearly as well in practice as advertised. Let's see if the French one does (although we might never actually know). A drone with a laser designator can accomplish the same thing reliably.