https://www.yahoo.com/news/permission-wi...57176.html
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.
Interesting timing on this article. As will become apparent when you read it I emphatically concur with some of its arguments, but certainly not all. I agree that US strategy must define the desired end state and have a feasible and credible plan to achieve this end state. This is critical to success and we apparently don't have such a plan. Obviously all plans must change as events unfold. Good plans drive events and have branches for various outcomes. If you find yourself constantly reacting to events and changing your plan frequently it is probably wise to step back and reconsider your basic assumptions.
I do not agree with the "rosy" picture painted in the article regarding the results of making Russia part of a "free fire" zone for ATACMS. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATACMS at their disposal to prevent Russian military operations. Neither does (or did) the US. It is a tool Ukraine should be able to employ "appropriately" considering the limited stocks. A "free fire" zone is useful in that it imposes significant "costs" on Russia, even if the ATACMS is only used when Russia screws up and exposes a high value target. The situation in northern Ukraine is "different". Regular M30-M31 rockets can be used to good effect inside Russia. Ukraine has lots of those, and IMO there should never have been a restriction on using them.
I am also troubled about the apparently cavalier attitude the quoted sources have towards what Putin will or will not do. Once again, it is a capability vs intention situation. Many battles have been lost and many wars have been started based on a misunderstanding of your opponents intentions. Intentions are very difficult to ascertain because they involve what people think. Capabilities can, at least in theory, be objectively measured. In this case, we know Russia has a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons. They have the capability. While I agree that Putin almost certainly will not use them just because the US declares Russia a free fire zone for US weapons operated by Ukrainians, that isn't cast in stone. The US needs a contingency plan of what we will do if Putin uses one. Do we have that in place? I doubt it. The real danger of incrementally testing Russia resolve in Ukraine is that Russia's repeated forbearance will convince us that it will continue. A similar situation existed in 1939. The German NCA was convinced that since the Allies had accepted the Anschluss and caved in on Czechoslovakia they would do the same in Poland. The reaction in the German High Command was shock when Britain actually declared war. They literally said "Well, what do we do now?" knowing there really was no plan in existence. We don't want to be there.