[Goose]

Oops.

Ukrainian troops crossed the border earlier this month to find Russian troops in disarray. Missteps by Moscow are characteristic of a top brass often out of touch with battlefield realities.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-...k-9a624abd

BC

IMO the main problem in the border area was lack of a unified command. Councils are a very bad way to run a war. If it was a "normal" border area where the main problems are smuggling and illegal migration it might work. When you are at war with that country it won't. Unity of command is an established military principle.  Getting rid of the council was probably a good idea.

However, when one makes such a decision, there needs to be a plan in place to unify the force, establish the new reporting lines, enforce common training (and associated standards) and establish overall and unit objectives. Doing all this in the face of the enemy is suicidal. It would be hard enough to do in peacetime. In the event, the Russian Army did none of the above. This probably was due in part to the fact the Army had no "new" forces and/or experienced commanders to execute the effort. Col. Gen. Lapin probably did not have the authority to issue orders to members of the FSB. Even if he did, he had no administrative method to do so. He is not in their reporting chain. The council was probably a kludge with the goal of unifying different command elements without changing their official reporting lines. Such kludges seldom work. How much difference having the "council" in existence when Ukraine attacked would have made is conjectural, but I suspect not much. The members each had little "reserve" to commit and they too are "stove-piped" by their command structure in requesting help. Lateral cooperation was not a Soviet strength and that hasn't changed in the Russian Federation. The article in Business Insider points out:

It's unclear how effective the agency's response would have been to Ukraine's surprise attack, per the outlet. But without it, Russia has definitely struggled to push back Ukraine's forces.

Even in the US transferring the USCG to the Navy in time of war historically introduces a significant glitch into USCG operations. In that case, there are clear reporting lines that move with the transfer. Now imagine if the USCG command structure remained part of the DHS but it was expected to fight as part of the Navy.

[Goose]

Oops.

Ukrainian troops crossed the border earlier this month to find Russian troops in disarray. Missteps by Moscow are characteristic of a top brass often out of touch with battlefield realities.

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-...k-9a624abd

BC

IMO the main problem in the border area was lack of a unified command. Councils are a very bad way to run a war. If it was a "normal" border area where the main problems are smuggling and illegal migration it might work. When you are at war with that country it won't. Unity of command is an established military principle.  Getting rid of the council was probably a good idea.

However, when one makes such a decision, there needs to be a plan in place to unify the force, establish the new reporting lines, enforce common training (and associated standards) and establish overall and unit objectives. Doing all this in the face of the enemy is suicidal. It would be hard enough to do in peacetime. In the event, the Russian Army did none of the above. This probably was due in part to the fact the Army had no "new" forces and/or experienced commanders to execute the effort. Col. Gen. Lapin probably did not have the authority to issue orders to members of the FSB. Even if he did, he had no administrative method to do so. He is not in their reporting chain. The council was probably a kludge with the goal of unifying different command elements without changing their official reporting lines. Such kludges seldom work. How much difference having the "council" in existence when Ukraine attacked would have made is conjectural, but I suspect not much. The members each had little "reserve" to commit and they too are "stove-piped" by their command structure in requesting help. Lateral cooperation was not a Soviet strength and that hasn't changed in the Russian Federation. The article in Business Insider points out:

It's unclear how effective the agency's response would have been to Ukraine's surprise attack, per the outlet. But without it, Russia has definitely struggled to push back Ukraine's forces.

Even in the US transferring the USCG to the Navy in time of war historically introduces a significant glitch into USCG operations. In that case, there are clear reporting lines that move with the transfer. Now imagine if the USCG command structure remained part of the DHS but it was expected to fight as part of the Navy.