[Goose]

North Korea obviously can't sustain that rate of donating shells to Russia.

Why is it obvious? North Korea has been a military state since 1945. They have 1.2 million soldiers in their Army. I don't know how many shells they have stockpiled or how many they can make in a year, so I can't say what they can or can't do. You may have better data. What I could find is this: https://politics.stackexchange.com/quest...ery-shells. This indicates that North Korea produces 2 million rounds of 152mm at "peacetime" effort levels. Their "wartime" level is 4-6 million rounds per year. If Russia is helping by providing raw materials it could be more. They are definitely converting existing infrastructure to make shells for Russia.

Russia will run out of their Soviet stocks of tanks and IFVs in 2025, or maybe 2026 if they reduce the intensity of their offensives.

That may be true. An example of articles saying this is https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/2...ine-211947. However, this article at least says the following:

It seems the storage facilities could now be close to empty – at least of vehicles that could be serviceable and able to be returned to combat. As a result, even on paper, Russia's tank force is appearing to be quite lean, according to a report this week from The Economist, which suggested Moscow will reach a "critical point of depletion" by as early as next year.

"Could be" isn't "are". Forecasts of Russia depleting their assets have been frequent but so far overly optimistic. When I hear it from NATO intelligence sources I might believe it. It is true that Russia will run "short" of these assets at some point. Given the way Russia uses its IFVs and tanks they neither need nor want the "latest and greatest". The lack of artillery and tank tubes that are not worn out could be an equally large problem. I could also point out that North Korea has quite a few artillery assets that it could sell to Russia. Many of these assets are obsolete, but that works fine for Russia. IMO it is not wise to assume this will become a "savior" for Ukraine.

But will the West lose their nerve or simply their patience before then?

An additional question is "Will Ukraine lose their ability to effectively resist Russian infantry pressure and/or missile attacks?" The signs in Donbas are not good. There are both kinetic and morale issues that are not trending in a positive direction. Obviously the election outcome will greatly affect what the US does and many "knock on" effects will exist, either way. It will also IMO greatly affect what Ukraine does. One thing I believe that all sides should be aware of is that Ukraine will not stop fighting even if they are "defeated" and a political surrender effected. Guerilla war will undoubtedly break out if it comes to that. Ukraine is going to be a disaster area for quite a few years no matter the "outcome" of this war.

[Goose]

North Korea obviously can't sustain that rate of donating shells to Russia.

Why is it obvious? North Korea has been a military state since 1945. They have 1.2 million soldiers in their Army. I don't know how many shells they have stockpiled or how many they can make in a year, so I can't say what they can or can't do. You may have better data. What I could find is this: https://politics.stackexchange.com/quest...ery-shells. This indicates that North Korea produces 2 million rounds of 152mm at "peacetime" effort levels. Their "wartime" level is 4-6 million rounds per year. If Russia is helping by providing raw materials it could be more. They are definitely converting existing infrastructure to make shells for Russia.

Russia will run out of their Soviet stocks of tanks and IFVs in 2025, or maybe 2026 if they reduce the intensity of their offensives.

That may be true. An example of articles saying this is https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/2...ine-211947. However, this article at least says the following:

It seems the storage facilities could now be close to empty – at least of vehicles that could be serviceable and able to be returned to combat. As a result, even on paper, Russia's tank force is appearing to be quite lean, according to a report this week from The Economist, which suggested Moscow will reach a "critical point of depletion" by as early as next year.

"Could be" isn't "are". Forecasts of Russia depleting their assets have been frequent but so far overly optimistic. When I hear it from NATO intelligence sources I might believe it. It is true that Russia will run "short" of these assets at some point. Given the way Russia uses its IFVs and tanks they neither need nor want the "latest and greatest". The lack of artillery and tank tubes that are not worn out could be an equally large problem. I could also point out that North Korea has quite a few artillery assets that it could sell to Russia. Many of these assets are obsolete, but that works fine for Russia. IMO it is not wise to assume this will become a "savior" for Ukraine.

But will the West lose their nerve or simply their patience before then?

An additional question is "Will Ukraine lose their ability to effectively resist Russian infantry pressure and/or missile attacks?" The signs in Donbas are not good. There are both kinetic and morale issues that are not trending in a positive direction. Obviously the election outcome will greatly affect what the US does and many "knock on" effects will exist, either way. It will also IMO greatly affect what Ukraine does. One thing I believe that all sides should be aware of is that Ukraine will not stop fighting even if they are "defeated" and a political surrender effected. Guerilla war will undoubtedly break out if it comes to that. Ukraine is going to be a disaster area for quite a few years no matter the "outcome" of this war.