[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-why-w...00644.html

Interesting article. IMO some of what it says is valid. I don't think the calculus of what a Ukrainian victory would do to Russia's future weighs very heavily with the US leadership. I don't think they are that sophisticated. What does inhibit a "rational" analysis that results in the need for a plan to "win" is simply the fear of escalation resulting in a war with Russia and all the risk that entails. Some European allies might be worried about a power vacuum in Russia but the US is not. As usual, we will cross that bridge when we come to it :-).

I do agree with the author that when Russia finally has to deal with the economic consequences of this war internal rebellions are almost assured. If the war is lost these rebellions will be strengthened. Some of them may succeed. Most will not. Many of the "oppressed minorities" are surrounded by solidly Russian territories. Even if they achieved political independence they couldn't survive without Russia. Doesn't mean the won't try. One thing the article says I strongly disagree with:

A just-as-likely scenario would involve amicable relations among newly independent states and a greatly weakened, even defanged, Russia.

That is the least likely of all the scenarios by orders of magnitude. There are very few ways thing could go "right" and many. many, more ways things could go "wrong". China, Turkey,  and Iran would help the "go wrong" scenario, even if doing so unintentionally. The Muslim rebels can't help but want aid. China wants stability on its northern border and at least "added influence" in that area. They have reasons. Entropy proceeds to disorder, and that will apply in this case :-).

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-why-w...00644.html

Interesting article. IMO some of what it says is valid. I don't think the calculus of what a Ukrainian victory would do to Russia's future weighs very heavily with the US leadership. I don't think they are that sophisticated. What does inhibit a "rational" analysis that results in the need for a plan to "win" is simply the fear of escalation resulting in a war with Russia and all the risk that entails. Some European allies might be worried about a power vacuum in Russia but the US is not. As usual, we will cross that bridge when we come to it :-).

I do agree with the author that when Russia finally has to deal with the economic consequences of this war internal rebellions are almost assured. If the war is lost these rebellions will be strengthened. Some of them may succeed. Most will not. Many of the "oppressed minorities" are surrounded by solidly Russian territories. Even if they achieved political independence they couldn't survive without Russia. Doesn't mean the won't try. One thing the article says I strongly disagree with:

A just-as-likely scenario would involve amicable relations among newly independent states and a greatly weakened, even defanged, Russia.

That is the least likely of all the scenarios by orders of magnitude. There are very few ways thing could go "right" and many. many, more ways things could go "wrong". China, Turkey,  and Iran would help the "go wrong" scenario, even if doing so unintentionally. The Muslim rebels can't help but want aid. China wants stability on its northern border and at least "added influence" in that area. They have reasons. Entropy proceeds to disorder, and that will apply in this case :-).