https://www.yahoo.com/news/opinion-biden...00383.html
Not sure what real "insight" based on actual facts (direct access) the book contains. The description given seems consistent with the observed external behavior. IMO giving Ukraine missiles that can reach well into Russia would be a prerequisite to Ukraine "winning". However, that would be far from sufficient. Several years ago the correlation of forces was such that the US could have provided Ukraine with the necessary equipment to defeat Russia. Russia was a mess militarily and was not reforming its military nor building up its military-industrial complex. They were flat-footed. The failure to win a quick, low-cost victory was not expected and there was no "Plan B".
Our failure to help Ukraine to build up quickly to win the war quickly has allowed the Russians to "wake up" and correct many of their deficiencies. They have allied themself with and received meaningful support from Iran and North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in 2022. The leadership of the Russian military has been replaced with one that is at least minimally competent. That was not the case in 2022. Russia is losing over 1,000 troops per day. It appears they are in a position where they can do that indefinitely.
Ukraine OTOH has also suffered very large personnel losses from an initial population that was much smaller than Russia. Ukraine still does not have a meaningful Air Force. Ukraine still lacks the ability to train troops in adequate quantities to increase their Army to the point they can "win" the war. Ukraine also cannot defend itself from the increasing Russian drone and missile attacks. Worse still, the VKS is finally playing a meaningful role in the war. This will only get worse as Ukraine has no answer.
The situation in Ukraine today is IMO a caricature of the situation between Germany and the USSR after the failure of Citadel (battle of Kursk). Of course, the current war involves a very tiny fraction of the forces used by both sides in the aftermath of Kursk. Ukraine, like Germany, has "lost" air superiority. Unlike Germany in 1943 Ukraine never had it. That is a major reason the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 failed. Russia can now strike Ukraine from the air and via missiles with Ukraine being unable to stop them. Like the Luftwaffe, Ukraine can defend and fight back, but it is a battle of attrition. Another critical difference is that neither side has a large effective mechanized force. In 2023 Russia did not have the 2.6 million men used in 1943. They didn't have 5 tank armies ready to exploit Ukraine's defeat in Zaporizhia. It is an infantry war unlike the WW II situation. Everything happens in "slow motion".
Some of the quotes from German sources in the aftermath of Citadel (by Robin Cross) sound exactly like what Ukrainian sources are saying today. The reason this is important is that we know how things went for the Ostheer going forward. If that is to be avoided, attention has to be paid to the precedent. Apparently (if one believes the above link) decisions were made that ignores this correlation of forces. It may be unlikely that the new administration will do better, but if it does not, the worst-case scenario will almost certainly ensue.
Not sure what real "insight" based on actual facts (direct access) the book contains. The description given seems consistent with the observed external behavior. IMO giving Ukraine missiles that can reach well into Russia would be a prerequisite to Ukraine "winning". However, that would be far from sufficient. Several years ago the correlation of forces was such that the US could have provided Ukraine with the necessary equipment to defeat Russia. Russia was a mess militarily and was not reforming its military nor building up its military-industrial complex. They were flat-footed. The failure to win a quick, low-cost victory was not expected and there was no "Plan B".
Our failure to help Ukraine to build up quickly to win the war quickly has allowed the Russians to "wake up" and correct many of their deficiencies. They have allied themself with and received meaningful support from Iran and North Korea. This would have been unthinkable in 2022. The leadership of the Russian military has been replaced with one that is at least minimally competent. That was not the case in 2022. Russia is losing over 1,000 troops per day. It appears they are in a position where they can do that indefinitely.
Ukraine OTOH has also suffered very large personnel losses from an initial population that was much smaller than Russia. Ukraine still does not have a meaningful Air Force. Ukraine still lacks the ability to train troops in adequate quantities to increase their Army to the point they can "win" the war. Ukraine also cannot defend itself from the increasing Russian drone and missile attacks. Worse still, the VKS is finally playing a meaningful role in the war. This will only get worse as Ukraine has no answer.
The situation in Ukraine today is IMO a caricature of the situation between Germany and the USSR after the failure of Citadel (battle of Kursk). Of course, the current war involves a very tiny fraction of the forces used by both sides in the aftermath of Kursk. Ukraine, like Germany, has "lost" air superiority. Unlike Germany in 1943 Ukraine never had it. That is a major reason the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 failed. Russia can now strike Ukraine from the air and via missiles with Ukraine being unable to stop them. Like the Luftwaffe, Ukraine can defend and fight back, but it is a battle of attrition. Another critical difference is that neither side has a large effective mechanized force. In 2023 Russia did not have the 2.6 million men used in 1943. They didn't have 5 tank armies ready to exploit Ukraine's defeat in Zaporizhia. It is an infantry war unlike the WW II situation. Everything happens in "slow motion".
Some of the quotes from German sources in the aftermath of Citadel (by Robin Cross) sound exactly like what Ukrainian sources are saying today. The reason this is important is that we know how things went for the Ostheer going forward. If that is to be avoided, attention has to be paid to the precedent. Apparently (if one believes the above link) decisions were made that ignores this correlation of forces. It may be unlikely that the new administration will do better, but if it does not, the worst-case scenario will almost certainly ensue.