[Goose]

Ukraine seems to be proving that small cheap drones even without fancy guidance systems can function as counter battery fire.  Ukraine has cost russia billions I would think just via their cheap drone systems.  How many drones can you build for the cost of a SPH?  Do you think Reaper drones can survive very long in peer vs peer conflicts?  They were great when the other side had no real air defense systems, but I wonder how long one would survive in the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. I presume we are working on smaller, much cheaper drones with at least semi hardened controls etc.  The Ukraine conflict is sort like either the Spanish Civil War or WWI when new technology came on line and changed the nature of conflicts.

 

Interesting points. In fact, it is very probable that Russia has had more success in using drones for counter-battery than Ukraine has. Looking at drones in counter-battery fire lead me into the suitability of drones for various battlefield tasks. There is a lot of information available on the internet. There are also many authors that have apparently valuable information, some of which unverifiable. These authors also clearly have biases and vested interests. In the following I am going to cite quite a few links. Some of them are about commercial drone specifications and are 100% reliable, if sometimes intentionally opaque. There is other information I will cite whose provenance varies from "probably true" to "almost certainly fiction" with "who knows?" in the middle. I will try to identify which is which when citing it.

 

In the following posts I will attempt to provide as much information as possible about the state of "drone warfare" in Ukraine. I will first present the characteristics of the various drone types along with information on how they are being/will be used in Ukraine. I will in the main try to avoid editorial comment in this first part of the document. It will therefore be somewhat dry. Subsequently I will make a bold attempt at what I think it all means.

 

IMO it is real important to understand the SERIOUS limitations on what we know about drone warfare in Ukraine. The material that makes it onto the internet almost exclusively describes cases where the drone was successful, on both the Ukrainian and Russian "sides". There is little or no context. How many drones are sent out and accomplish nothing? How many drones crash due to enemy action, either electronic warfare or kinetic action? How many drones attempt to deliver their weapons and miss?  There is reason to believe these events are actually quite common. Through all human history I know of no aviator that over-estimated the damage they have done to the enemy :-). There is no reason that should be less true today. Some information on drone attrition and mission failure rates does exist. However, it is somewhat anecdotal and not "official". It is sometimes self-contradictory. We have to make do with what we have.

There are two important considerations in all FPV drone operations that IMO are a required background for understanding some limitations of these drones. First, the control and video range of FPV drones have inherent physical tradeoffs in range and altitude. The following table illustrates a situation that obviously affects how FPV drones can be operated. The control commands of the operator and the video pictures from the drones must be exchanged with minimal failures. The radio horizon thereby provides a maximum limit on the range at which a drone can operate. The following table assumes the drone operator has an antenna mounted at a height of two meters. This height can probably be achieved by a drone operator operating from a bunker in the field. The antenna would of necessity be visible to enemy drones. It should therefore be as inconspicuous as possible.
Drone               Radio
Altitude (m)   Range (km)
      2              10.09
    10              13.33
    30              24.60
  200              55.53
3000            200.00
This table reveals that at a range of 13.33 km the operator will lose the video from and the control of the drone if the drone descends below an altitude of 10 meters. The range of a Paladin and M777 howitzer is 24 km using common ammunition. These units will not normally be placed very near the FEBA and when/if they are it will be in a "shoot and scoot" operation. Thus, the multirotor operator is limited in how close to the ground his drone may be when the ordinance is released. This significantly affects accuracy, as the longer the munition is falling, the more imperfections in shape and "windage" will affect its landing spot. One-way drone operators can no longer control the drone or see the target below that altitude. This renders the drone unguided during this interval, significantly degrading accuracy.

 

The situation described in the table relates to an earth model that is without obstructions. Obviously even in Ukraine there are trees and hills. Howitzers traditionally like to hide behind hills. The presence of any such obstructions makes the situation worse. Reconnaissance drone operators are probably not sitting on the front line. OTOH FPV Kamikaze drone operators often are quite close because their drones are short-range.
 
Increasing the power of the transmitter on the drone and/or installing better antennas will not increase the range. Many commercial drones do not have transmitters powerful enough to cover their maximum linear range because it would drain the battery too much and the drone is not going to return to base (RTB) if it goes beyond half its maximum unloaded distance. The power must be increased if the drone is to be used on one way missions. Placing the antenna for the drone operators (but not the operators) on a hill can increase the control range. Putting the antenna on the roof of a structure can as well. Obviously the down side is the antenna becomes more conspicuous inviting a counterstrike. Many FPV drone controllers do not support a remote antenna in any case.

 

It must be noted that "range" does not always translate into distance from the antenna. If the drone is searching a given area it may repeatedly cover the same area looking for targets. In that case it may need a long flight range but can tolerate a much shorter control/view range. OTOH some long range drones fly so far at low altitude that some kind of message forwarding is required. This may be accomplished by other drones, conventional  aircraft, or satellites. In these cases the "network delay" may be significant. This can render FPV manual flying difficult to impossible. Some drones therefore rely on GPS/INS or terrain following to reach their desired waypoints/targets.  

 

The second area where IMO there is confusion is cost. While it is absolutely true the drones being used in Ukraine (by both sides) are MUCH cheaper than the mil-spec competition made in the US and the EU, it seems there is significant confusion about cost. A range of [drone costs] broken down by category illustrates the actual prices. The Mavic 3 is at the top  the entry-level camera drones range. DJI sells the Mavic 3 Pro with an "entry-level" controller for $2,199. One can find the drone by itself for $1,800 or so. Thus, the price is actually quite cheap given the capability. This is an issue the US military does have to confront. However, it isn't as cheap as it is often portrayed in the news. The price increase as drones become larger is quite nonlinear. It goes up faster than the capability goes up. Adding more and more capability to the drone requires the additions become smaller and lighter. Once the threshold of consumer electronics practice is exceeded, prices shoot up.

 

While I was gathering information for these posts I found this report [CNAS] that addressed the same subjects in a manner far more comprehensive than I ever could. IMO this report is a must-read. It isn't short, but it is all IMO worthwhile. It contains an interesting conclusion section starting on page 38. IMO that is a quadruple must-read. The only major deficiency of this report is that it was released in February 2024. Quite a bit has happened in the last year, so reading the rest of my efforts might still be worthwhile :-). Subsequent events do arguably modify a couple of the conclusions of CNAS report.

 

Please visit this [link]. Scroll to the top and read this whole thing. It surveys almost all the important characteristics of drones and discusses the limiting factors on drone performance. The table of ranges is also particularly useful. This [link]  talks about drones in general and provides good specific examples of each type. It categorizes drones into three basic types, Fixed-Wing Drones, Multirotor Drones, and VTOL Drones. I follow that nomenclature. I will also divide drones into those that are "one way attack" (Kamikaze) and those that are not.

[Goose]

Ukraine seems to be proving that small cheap drones even without fancy guidance systems can function as counter battery fire.  Ukraine has cost russia billions I would think just via their cheap drone systems.  How many drones can you build for the cost of a SPH?  Do you think Reaper drones can survive very long in peer vs peer conflicts?  They were great when the other side had no real air defense systems, but I wonder how long one would survive in the Ukraine vs Russia conflict. I presume we are working on smaller, much cheaper drones with at least semi hardened controls etc.  The Ukraine conflict is sort like either the Spanish Civil War or WWI when new technology came on line and changed the nature of conflicts.

 

Interesting points. In fact, it is very probable that Russia has had more success in using drones for counter-battery than Ukraine has. Looking at drones in counter-battery fire lead me into the suitability of drones for various battlefield tasks. There is a lot of information available on the internet. There are also many authors that have apparently valuable information, some of which unverifiable. These authors also clearly have biases and vested interests. In the following I am going to cite quite a few links. Some of them are about commercial drone specifications and are 100% reliable, if sometimes intentionally opaque. There is other information I will cite whose provenance varies from "probably true" to "almost certainly fiction" with "who knows?" in the middle. I will try to identify which is which when citing it.

 

In the following posts I will attempt to provide as much information as possible about the state of "drone warfare" in Ukraine. I will first present the characteristics of the various drone types along with information on how they are being/will be used in Ukraine. I will in the main try to avoid editorial comment in this first part of the document. It will therefore be somewhat dry. Subsequently I will make a bold attempt at what I think it all means.

 

IMO it is real important to understand the SERIOUS limitations on what we know about drone warfare in Ukraine. The material that makes it onto the internet almost exclusively describes cases where the drone was successful, on both the Ukrainian and Russian "sides". There is little or no context. How many drones are sent out and accomplish nothing? How many drones crash due to enemy action, either electronic warfare or kinetic action? How many drones attempt to deliver their weapons and miss?  There is reason to believe these events are actually quite common. Through all human history I know of no aviator that over-estimated the damage they have done to the enemy :-). There is no reason that should be less true today. Some information on drone attrition and mission failure rates does exist. However, it is somewhat anecdotal and not "official". It is sometimes self-contradictory. We have to make do with what we have.

There are two important considerations in all FPV drone operations that IMO are a required background for understanding some limitations of these drones. First, the control and video range of FPV drones have inherent physical tradeoffs in range and altitude. The following table illustrates a situation that obviously affects how FPV drones can be operated. The control commands of the operator and the video pictures from the drones must be exchanged with minimal failures. The radio horizon thereby provides a maximum limit on the range at which a drone can operate. The following table assumes the drone operator has an antenna mounted at a height of two meters. This height can probably be achieved by a drone operator operating from a bunker in the field. The antenna would of necessity be visible to enemy drones. It should therefore be as inconspicuous as possible.
Drone               Radio
Altitude (m)   Range (km)
      2              10.09
    10              13.33
    30              24.60
  200              55.53
3000            200.00
This table reveals that at a range of 13.33 km the operator will lose the video from and the control of the drone if the drone descends below an altitude of 10 meters. The range of a Paladin and M777 howitzer is 24 km using common ammunition. These units will not normally be placed very near the FEBA and when/if they are it will be in a "shoot and scoot" operation. Thus, the multirotor operator is limited in how close to the ground his drone may be when the ordinance is released. This significantly affects accuracy, as the longer the munition is falling, the more imperfections in shape and "windage" will affect its landing spot. One-way drone operators can no longer control the drone or see the target below that altitude. This renders the drone unguided during this interval, significantly degrading accuracy.

 

The situation described in the table relates to an earth model that is without obstructions. Obviously even in Ukraine there are trees and hills. Howitzers traditionally like to hide behind hills. The presence of any such obstructions makes the situation worse. Reconnaissance drone operators are probably not sitting on the front line. OTOH FPV Kamikaze drone operators often are quite close because their drones are short-range.
 
Increasing the power of the transmitter on the drone and/or installing better antennas will not increase the range. Many commercial drones do not have transmitters powerful enough to cover their maximum linear range because it would drain the battery too much and the drone is not going to return to base (RTB) if it goes beyond half its maximum unloaded distance. The power must be increased if the drone is to be used on one way missions. Placing the antenna for the drone operators (but not the operators) on a hill can increase the control range. Putting the antenna on the roof of a structure can as well. Obviously the down side is the antenna becomes more conspicuous inviting a counterstrike. Many FPV drone controllers do not support a remote antenna in any case.

 

It must be noted that "range" does not always translate into distance from the antenna. If the drone is searching a given area it may repeatedly cover the same area looking for targets. In that case it may need a long flight range but can tolerate a much shorter control/view range. OTOH some long range drones fly so far at low altitude that some kind of message forwarding is required. This may be accomplished by other drones, conventional  aircraft, or satellites. In these cases the "network delay" may be significant. This can render FPV manual flying difficult to impossible. Some drones therefore rely on GPS/INS or terrain following to reach their desired waypoints/targets.  

 

The second area where IMO there is confusion is cost. While it is absolutely true the drones being used in Ukraine (by both sides) are MUCH cheaper than the mil-spec competition made in the US and the EU, it seems there is significant confusion about cost. A range of [drone costs] broken down by category illustrates the actual prices. The Mavic 3 is at the top  the entry-level camera drones range. DJI sells the Mavic 3 Pro with an "entry-level" controller for $2,199. One can find the drone by itself for $1,800 or so. Thus, the price is actually quite cheap given the capability. This is an issue the US military does have to confront. However, it isn't as cheap as it is often portrayed in the news. The price increase as drones become larger is quite nonlinear. It goes up faster than the capability goes up. Adding more and more capability to the drone requires the additions become smaller and lighter. Once the threshold of consumer electronics practice is exceeded, prices shoot up.

 

While I was gathering information for these posts I found this report [CNAS] that addressed the same subjects in a manner far more comprehensive than I ever could. IMO this report is a must-read. It isn't short, but it is all IMO worthwhile. It contains an interesting conclusion section starting on page 38. IMO that is a quadruple must-read. The only major deficiency of this report is that it was released in February 2024. Quite a bit has happened in the last year, so reading the rest of my efforts might still be worthwhile :-). Subsequent events do arguably modify a couple of the conclusions of CNAS report.

 

Please visit this [link]. Scroll to the top and read this whole thing. It surveys almost all the important characteristics of drones and discusses the limiting factors on drone performance. The table of ranges is also particularly useful. This [link]  talks about drones in general and provides good specific examples of each type. It categorizes drones into three basic types, Fixed-Wing Drones, Multirotor Drones, and VTOL Drones. I follow that nomenclature. I will also divide drones into those that are "one way attack" (Kamikaze) and those that are not.