[Goose]

[CB-4]  describes the state of play as of 10-Oct-2023, four months after CB-3. The Lancet drones were clearly having a growing effect. This situation would continue for about a year. CB-4 has lots of interesting information but it also contains some pretty big "reaches". The biggest one is their acceptance of the known very pro-Russian Lost Armor estimates of destroyed and damaged Ukrainian artillery. In the section entitled The Artillery Killer it states

This suggests that Lancets may be responsible for 64% of Ukrainian self-propelled gun losses.

It is much more probable that Lost Armor's evaluation of Lancet effectiveness is wildly overstated, given that Onyx in general reports losses from "known" incidents at under 50% of what Lost Armor claims. Even allowing for that, it was still true that Lancets were becoming more numerous and more effective.

 

CB-4 contains other "interesting" statements:

“The lethality of Lancet is often insufficient,” according to the RUSI Report  [CB-1]. “One officer also said that although he had seen his gun ‘destroyed’ several times online, it remained alive and well.”

This statement appears in many different Internet articles. Probably at least close to true.

The claim in May by Russia’s RIA Novosti that Lancet-3s had destroyed 45% of Ukraine’s Western-supplied artillery is likely a wild exaggeration based on this sort of overcounting.

Yep. No substantiating data at all.

But it is clear that a high proportion of Ukrainian artillery losses are from Lancets, and those losses are likely to increase as more Lancets are deployed.

If the claims are a "wild exaggeration" why is it "clear"? There are many other Russians out there trying to kill Ukrainian artillery using drones for "hunting" and conventional artillery for "killing". Why is that not a candidate for a "high proportion of Ukrainian losses"? CB-4 also states that Lancets miss 70% of the time. When they don't miss, their lethality is questioned. Makes one wonder about the actual number of targets being destroyed.

 

Russia realized that using the Lancet to find targets was inefficient in two different ways. First, once launched a Lancet is expended. It may be totally wasted. Russia also realized they had the ZALA 421-16ES and Orlan-10 drones that could search for targets literally all day. These drones are multiple use so days with no targets do not cause their loss. Second, the Lancet could operate much deeper into Ukrainian territory if it did not waste its battery power looking for targets. This led to a much more successful employment of the Lancet drone as the "killer" of a "hunter-killer" team. The reconnaissance drone could locate the target. A Lancet would be launched  at that time. It would attack the target while the "hunter" watched. If necessary, multiple Lancets could be called upon until the target was destroyed. Russians do learn.

 

It immediately became obvious that at the greater distances where the Lancet was being used that the radio horizon was a problem. The Lancet missed a lot because it couldn't be steered for the last 10-30 meters of flight. The solution was to add a third drone that would function as a radio "router". This drone could fly higher than the other drones because it had no FPV capability and didn't need to see anything. The higher altitude does provide a much greater radio horizon. This extends the radio horizon of the Lancet and allows the pilot to fly the drone precisely all the way to impact. This approach led to much greater success for the Lancet, particularly against Ukrainian artillery. The "drone stack" approach has lots of moving parts and is therefor somewhat of a challenge to execute reliably. For that reason the role of radio relay is often devolved to the "hunter" drone.

 

It is clear that for a period of over a year Ukraine experienced some "very significant" attrition of artillery assets due to "hunter-killer" activity. Ukraine did develop countermeasures to this threat. [CB-5] documents the effects of Ukrainian "interceptor" drone activity in this effort. Starting in  September of 2024 Lancet attacks of all types have fallen significantly. This coincides with Ukraine beginning their interceptor activities "in earnest".  Quoting CB-5

The interceptors are not bringing down many Lancets: instead they are taking out the reconnaissance and communication assets which enable them to find targets.

This destruction carries a double whammy. Normally, succeed or fail, the reconnaissance drones returned to fight another day. If intercepted, they don't. These drones are considerably more expensive and more difficult to build than DJI equivalents. Sanctions make it even more difficult for Russia.

 

Even more importantly Ukrainian jamming started to have a significant effect on Orlan-10s and ZALA 421-16ES drones. Jamming the data signal makes it impossible to use them as target locators for kinetic weapons, Lancet or otherwise. Jamming the control signal (on a different frequency) does not in general cause these drones to crash in the near term. They just keep flying straight ahead until they run out of fuel. Quoting CB-5 again

It is often overlooked that drones are now providing continuous surveillance of the entire length of the battlefront to a considerable depth. This intelligence gathering capability may be the most significant aspect of drone warfare, enabling deep, high-precision strikes with a variety of weapons from cruise missiles to rockets to airstrikes to attack drones.

This statement captures the real value of drones in the war. Lancets are "sexy" but only a much lesser part of Russia's attrition of Ukrainian artillery.

 

IMO the "takeaways" from all this are that drones used for reconnaissance have greatly expanded the ability to destroy artillery wherever it may be independent of a direct response to it firing (counter-battery). As [CB-1] states

Russian artillery units were laagered up to 12–15 km behind the frontline, and that they spend the night even further away. They only approach the frontline to conduct fire missions and withdraw as quickly as possible, indicating that doctrine on proximity has given way to concerns over survivability.

Note that 12-15 km is slightly beyond the absolute maximum two-way range of a Mavic 3. Ukraine forced Russia to change its doctrine to survive. Ukraine undoubtedly killed lots of Russian artillery using drone observed conventional artillery when the Russians approached the desired 3-4 km of the front line.

 

Russia OTOH went through an evolutionary process that allowed them to eventually make a noticeable dent in Ukrainian artillery assets. This effort made use of artillery, aircraft, and Lancet drones. Russia's longer range tactical fixed-wing reconnaissance drones gave them an advantage in this effort. A combination of Ukrainian interceptors and jamming subsequently suppressed the Russian ability to execute this strategy.

 

Ukraine did and does have available very good fixed-wing reconnaissance drones. The following links detail their attributes [URD-1] [URD-2]  [URD-3] [URD-4] [URD-5] [URD-6]. The GOR has some potentially VERY interesting attributes based on its video. Unfortunately Ukraine has not been able to really take advantage of these drones. It may be the inability to focus on one or two options is an issue. It also may be simply their much higher cost. In any event, as [CNAS] states

Russia’s military drones proved an enduring strength and area where Russian forces had a comparative advantage over Ukraine’s less numerous and capable military drone fleet.

[Goose]

[CB-4]  describes the state of play as of 10-Oct-2023, four months after CB-3. The Lancet drones were clearly having a growing effect. This situation would continue for about a year. CB-4 has lots of interesting information but it also contains some pretty big "reaches". The biggest one is their acceptance of the known very pro-Russian Lost Armor estimates of destroyed and damaged Ukrainian artillery. In the section entitled The Artillery Killer it states

This suggests that Lancets may be responsible for 64% of Ukrainian self-propelled gun losses.

It is much more probable that Lost Armor's evaluation of Lancet effectiveness is wildly overstated, given that Onyx in general reports losses from "known" incidents at under 50% of what Lost Armor claims. Even allowing for that, it was still true that Lancets were becoming more numerous and more effective.

 

CB-4 contains other "interesting" statements:

“The lethality of Lancet is often insufficient,” according to the RUSI Report  [CB-1]. “One officer also said that although he had seen his gun ‘destroyed’ several times online, it remained alive and well.”

This statement appears in many different Internet articles. Probably at least close to true.

The claim in May by Russia’s RIA Novosti that Lancet-3s had destroyed 45% of Ukraine’s Western-supplied artillery is likely a wild exaggeration based on this sort of overcounting.

Yep. No substantiating data at all.

But it is clear that a high proportion of Ukrainian artillery losses are from Lancets, and those losses are likely to increase as more Lancets are deployed.

If the claims are a "wild exaggeration" why is it "clear"? There are many other Russians out there trying to kill Ukrainian artillery using drones for "hunting" and conventional artillery for "killing". Why is that not a candidate for a "high proportion of Ukrainian losses"? CB-4 also states that Lancets miss 70% of the time. When they don't miss, their lethality is questioned. Makes one wonder about the actual number of targets being destroyed.

 

Russia realized that using the Lancet to find targets was inefficient in two different ways. First, once launched a Lancet is expended. It may be totally wasted. Russia also realized they had the ZALA 421-16ES and Orlan-10 drones that could search for targets literally all day. These drones are multiple use so days with no targets do not cause their loss. Second, the Lancet could operate much deeper into Ukrainian territory if it did not waste its battery power looking for targets. This led to a much more successful employment of the Lancet drone as the "killer" of a "hunter-killer" team. The reconnaissance drone could locate the target. A Lancet would be launched  at that time. It would attack the target while the "hunter" watched. If necessary, multiple Lancets could be called upon until the target was destroyed. Russians do learn.

 

It immediately became obvious that at the greater distances where the Lancet was being used that the radio horizon was a problem. The Lancet missed a lot because it couldn't be steered for the last 10-30 meters of flight. The solution was to add a third drone that would function as a radio "router". This drone could fly higher than the other drones because it had no FPV capability and didn't need to see anything. The higher altitude does provide a much greater radio horizon. This extends the radio horizon of the Lancet and allows the pilot to fly the drone precisely all the way to impact. This approach led to much greater success for the Lancet, particularly against Ukrainian artillery. The "drone stack" approach has lots of moving parts and is therefor somewhat of a challenge to execute reliably. For that reason the role of radio relay is often devolved to the "hunter" drone.

 

It is clear that for a period of over a year Ukraine experienced some "very significant" attrition of artillery assets due to "hunter-killer" activity. Ukraine did develop countermeasures to this threat. [CB-5] documents the effects of Ukrainian "interceptor" drone activity in this effort. Starting in  September of 2024 Lancet attacks of all types have fallen significantly. This coincides with Ukraine beginning their interceptor activities "in earnest".  Quoting CB-5

The interceptors are not bringing down many Lancets: instead they are taking out the reconnaissance and communication assets which enable them to find targets.

This destruction carries a double whammy. Normally, succeed or fail, the reconnaissance drones returned to fight another day. If intercepted, they don't. These drones are considerably more expensive and more difficult to build than DJI equivalents. Sanctions make it even more difficult for Russia.

 

Even more importantly Ukrainian jamming started to have a significant effect on Orlan-10s and ZALA 421-16ES drones. Jamming the data signal makes it impossible to use them as target locators for kinetic weapons, Lancet or otherwise. Jamming the control signal (on a different frequency) does not in general cause these drones to crash in the near term. They just keep flying straight ahead until they run out of fuel. Quoting CB-5 again

It is often overlooked that drones are now providing continuous surveillance of the entire length of the battlefront to a considerable depth. This intelligence gathering capability may be the most significant aspect of drone warfare, enabling deep, high-precision strikes with a variety of weapons from cruise missiles to rockets to airstrikes to attack drones.

This statement captures the real value of drones in the war. Lancets are "sexy" but only a much lesser part of Russia's attrition of Ukrainian artillery.

 

IMO the "takeaways" from all this are that drones used for reconnaissance have greatly expanded the ability to destroy artillery wherever it may be independent of a direct response to it firing (counter-battery). As [CB-1] states

Russian artillery units were laagered up to 12–15 km behind the frontline, and that they spend the night even further away. They only approach the frontline to conduct fire missions and withdraw as quickly as possible, indicating that doctrine on proximity has given way to concerns over survivability.

Note that 12-15 km is slightly beyond the absolute maximum two-way range of a Mavic 3. Ukraine forced Russia to change its doctrine to survive. Ukraine undoubtedly killed lots of Russian artillery using drone observed conventional artillery when the Russians approached the desired 3-4 km of the front line.

 

Russia OTOH went through an evolutionary process that allowed them to eventually make a noticeable dent in Ukrainian artillery assets. This effort made use of artillery, aircraft, and Lancet drones. Russia's longer range tactical fixed-wing reconnaissance drones gave them an advantage in this effort. A combination of Ukrainian interceptors and jamming subsequently suppressed the Russian ability to execute this strategy.

 

Ukraine did and does have available very good fixed-wing reconnaissance drones. The following links detail their attributes [URD-1] [URD-2]  [URD-3] [URD-4] [URD-5] [URD-6]. The GOR has some potentially VERY interesting attributes based on its video. Unfortunately Ukraine has not been able to really take advantage of these drones. It may be the inability to focus on one or two options is an issue. It also may be simply their much higher cost. In any event, as [CNAS] states

Russia’s military drones proved an enduring strength and area where Russian forces had a comparative advantage over Ukraine’s less numerous and capable military drone fleet.