[Goose]

When "conventional" counter-battery (using radar etc. to locate the enemy artillery) is the "main" threat, artillery can greatly improve their survivability by displacing quickly after firing. The shoot and scoot requirement is more easily met by SPH than by towed artillery. However, if reconnaissance drones are available they can often follow enemy artillery that is moving. They can also locate enemy artillery in laager. In this condition the best course of action for enemy artillery is to hide. Towed artillery like the M777 is inherently smaller and lower than SPHs. They can be more easily hidden. OTOH [CB-6] states

as the ability to ‘hide’ guns on the battlefield with become almost impossible due to what Gen. James Rainey, the chief of U.S. Army Futures Command, called the ‘absolute saturation’ of sensors.

In so far as that is true, artillery is indeed doomed. CB-6 does not at all address how being "nimble" prevents these same sensors from targeting your howitzer while it is driving down "the good road system of Europe" in front of God and everybody.

 

Artillery, both Ukrainian and Russian, is resorting to dispersion as a defense against the proliferation of sensors (reconnaissance drones). US Army batteries consist of six guns. It is desirable for logistical and C3 reason that the battery be kept together. Concentration also means that the battery can deliver a significant weight of fire from the same geometry. Communication is simple and simultaneous. The command element is right there if there is any confusion. All supplies can be delivered to one place. It is much simpler to make this structure "work".

 

The Ukraine war has demonstrated that a concentrated battery is a lucrative target for counter-battery artillery fire. It also means that if a drone finds one gun, it finds them all. Both Russia and Ukraine have countered this problem by dispersing their guns over a much wider area. In general, firing artillery to take out a single gun is not efficient. If the guns are concentrated, near misses will probably hit other guns. If the guns are widely  dispersed, the same number of shells will kill perhaps one gun. The downside is that each gun has to operate independently. The target coordinates have to be transferred to each gun and its firing solution computed. More room for error. Things are not inherently "simultaneous". It also requires more decision making by NCOs operating independently.

 

The US Army has lots of experience (going back to WW II) with Time On Target (TOT) firing, with dispersed guns all striking a give target at exactly the same moment. The US Army used lots of two gun sections in Afghanistan. Dispersal was often mandatory due to terrain. There was no room for more than two guns, or maybe one. We know how to do this. Ukraine and Russia have learned how on the fly. Russia lacks trained and experience NCOs. Their logistics are also not very good. Dispersion has hurt them much more than it has Ukraine.

 

[CB-7] provides an interesting example of Ukrainian FPV drones examining "hidden" Russian towed guns and destroying them. The weapon the drones are using appears to be a "sticky bomb" made from a thermite grenade. This is a "traditional" use of such weapons but placed by drones rather than infantry. It must be noted that in this case these guns were dispersed, but not by enough to matter. The drones easily found them all. One may also ask where are all the Russian 13Bs. Did they all go on break? One wonders if CB-7 is showing the destruction of a group of Russian guns that are inoperable and being readied for movement to repair depots.

 

Many of the ideas presented here are better expressed in [CB-8]. It is IMO worth a read. At this point, I hope the "No, but..." makes more sense to the reader. The presence of drones has changed many things on the battlefield. Much has been "learned" about drone warfare in Ukraine. However, the development of these new weapons is moving at a rapid pace. Paraphrasing Adolf Galland "By 1941 all we had learned from the experience of the Condor Legion in Spain was false".  Given the developments of jamming effectiveness in the last few months, it is IMO probable the same situation will exist regarding Ukraine, only quicker.

[Goose]

When "conventional" counter-battery (using radar etc. to locate the enemy artillery) is the "main" threat, artillery can greatly improve their survivability by displacing quickly after firing. The shoot and scoot requirement is more easily met by SPH than by towed artillery. However, if reconnaissance drones are available they can often follow enemy artillery that is moving. They can also locate enemy artillery in laager. In this condition the best course of action for enemy artillery is to hide. Towed artillery like the M777 is inherently smaller and lower than SPHs. They can be more easily hidden. OTOH [CB-6] states

as the ability to ‘hide’ guns on the battlefield with become almost impossible due to what Gen. James Rainey, the chief of U.S. Army Futures Command, called the ‘absolute saturation’ of sensors.

In so far as that is true, artillery is indeed doomed. CB-6 does not at all address how being "nimble" prevents these same sensors from targeting your howitzer while it is driving down "the good road system of Europe" in front of God and everybody.

 

Artillery, both Ukrainian and Russian, is resorting to dispersion as a defense against the proliferation of sensors (reconnaissance drones). US Army batteries consist of six guns. It is desirable for logistical and C3 reason that the battery be kept together. Concentration also means that the battery can deliver a significant weight of fire from the same geometry. Communication is simple and simultaneous. The command element is right there if there is any confusion. All supplies can be delivered to one place. It is much simpler to make this structure "work".

 

The Ukraine war has demonstrated that a concentrated battery is a lucrative target for counter-battery artillery fire. It also means that if a drone finds one gun, it finds them all. Both Russia and Ukraine have countered this problem by dispersing their guns over a much wider area. In general, firing artillery to take out a single gun is not efficient. If the guns are concentrated, near misses will probably hit other guns. If the guns are widely  dispersed, the same number of shells will kill perhaps one gun. The downside is that each gun has to operate independently. The target coordinates have to be transferred to each gun and its firing solution computed. More room for error. Things are not inherently "simultaneous". It also requires more decision making by NCOs operating independently.

 

The US Army has lots of experience (going back to WW II) with Time On Target (TOT) firing, with dispersed guns all striking a give target at exactly the same moment. The US Army used lots of two gun sections in Afghanistan. Dispersal was often mandatory due to terrain. There was no room for more than two guns, or maybe one. We know how to do this. Ukraine and Russia have learned how on the fly. Russia lacks trained and experience NCOs. Their logistics are also not very good. Dispersion has hurt them much more than it has Ukraine.

 

[CB-7] provides an interesting example of Ukrainian FPV drones examining "hidden" Russian towed guns and destroying them. The weapon the drones are using appears to be a "sticky bomb" made from a thermite grenade. This is a "traditional" use of such weapons but placed by drones rather than infantry. It must be noted that in this case these guns were dispersed, but not by enough to matter. The drones easily found them all. One may also ask where are all the Russian 13Bs. Did they all go on break? One wonders if CB-7 is showing the destruction of a group of Russian guns that are inoperable and being readied for movement to repair depots.

 

Many of the ideas presented here are better expressed in [CB-8]. It is IMO worth a read. At this point, I hope the "No, but..." makes more sense to the reader. The presence of drones has changed many things on the battlefield. Much has been "learned" about drone warfare in Ukraine. However, the development of these new weapons is moving at a rapid pace. Paraphrasing Adolf Galland "By 1941 all we had learned from the experience of the Condor Legion in Spain was false".  Given the developments of jamming effectiveness in the last few months, it is IMO probable the same situation will exist regarding Ukraine, only quicker.