[dabigv13]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

US Naval Institute report

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin...ir%20force.

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
....
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
.....
Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...20invasion.

In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many experts expected a fully mobilized Russian Aerospace Forces to quickly establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. A March 2022 New York Times report noted that “one of the biggest surprises of the war in Ukraine is Russia’s failure to defeat the Ukrainian Air Force. Military analysts had expected Russian forces to quickly destroy or paralyze Ukraine’s air defenses and military aircraft, yet neither has happened.”

American observers noted that the Russian Aerospace Forces was “literally … cratering empty fields.” An anonymous Defense Intelligence Agency source claimed that “under half of all Russian missiles hitting their aimpoint … we’re holding Russian missile success at just below 40 percent”—a damning assessment of the Russian technological capabilities. After a few days of the war, it became clear that the Russian Aerospace Forces had failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine and had been forced into a defensive posture by Ukrainian air defense units and fighter pilots. Russian failures were driven by an inability to quickly integrate intelligence with targeting processes, conduct unbiased battle damage assessments (BDAs) to inform war plans, and deconflict air space control between the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russian Army’s ground-based air defenses.

Yet these genuine failures obscure many successes, and the Russian air campaign has demonstrated strength alongside significant flaws. For instance, several months before the air war began, the Russian Aerospace Forces employed its Su-24MR Fencer-E reconnaissance aircraft and the Il-20 Coot electronic intelligence aircraft to generate a location map of Ukrainian air defenses. These technical intelligence platforms were supplemented by Ukrainian human intelligence sources cultivated by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. As the war began, Russian Su-34 bombers, Su-30SM fighters, and Su-35S fighters reportedly flew around 140 sorties in the first few days and struck targets deep inside Ukraine. At the same time, electronic warfare operations suppressed Ukrainian air defense assets. More than 100 fixed air-defense radar sites, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and munition storage sites were struck with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI. In addition, the air campaign was supplemented by large, coordinated missile salvos. Within the first couple months of the conflict, Russia had fired more missiles against Ukraine than any country had employed in a war since World War II.

https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/pu...e%20assets.

[dabigv13]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

US Naval Institute report

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedin...ir%20force.

Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted significantly more extensive fixed-wing strike operations during the first days of the invasion than has been previously documented, while Ukrainian ground-based air-defence (GBAD) capabilities were suppressed by initial attacks. 
During this period, Ukrainian fighter aircraft inflicted some losses on VKS aircraft but also took serious casualties due to being totally technologically outmatched and badly outnumbered.
....
From early March, the VKS lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
.....
Numerous MANPADS provided to Ukrainian troops and later mobile air-defence teams meant that low-altitude Russian fixed-wing and rotary penetrating sorties beyond the frontlines proved to be prohibitively costly during March, and ceased by April 2022.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...20invasion.

In the prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many experts expected a fully mobilized Russian Aerospace Forces to quickly establish complete air superiority over Ukraine. A March 2022 New York Times report noted that “one of the biggest surprises of the war in Ukraine is Russia’s failure to defeat the Ukrainian Air Force. Military analysts had expected Russian forces to quickly destroy or paralyze Ukraine’s air defenses and military aircraft, yet neither has happened.”

American observers noted that the Russian Aerospace Forces was “literally … cratering empty fields.” An anonymous Defense Intelligence Agency source claimed that “under half of all Russian missiles hitting their aimpoint … we’re holding Russian missile success at just below 40 percent”—a damning assessment of the Russian technological capabilities. After a few days of the war, it became clear that the Russian Aerospace Forces had failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine and had been forced into a defensive posture by Ukrainian air defense units and fighter pilots. Russian failures were driven by an inability to quickly integrate intelligence with targeting processes, conduct unbiased battle damage assessments (BDAs) to inform war plans, and deconflict air space control between the Russian Aerospace Forces and Russian Army’s ground-based air defenses.

Yet these genuine failures obscure many successes, and the Russian air campaign has demonstrated strength alongside significant flaws. For instance, several months before the air war began, the Russian Aerospace Forces employed its Su-24MR Fencer-E reconnaissance aircraft and the Il-20 Coot electronic intelligence aircraft to generate a location map of Ukrainian air defenses. These technical intelligence platforms were supplemented by Ukrainian human intelligence sources cultivated by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. As the war began, Russian Su-34 bombers, Su-30SM fighters, and Su-35S fighters reportedly flew around 140 sorties in the first few days and struck targets deep inside Ukraine. At the same time, electronic warfare operations suppressed Ukrainian air defense assets. More than 100 fixed air-defense radar sites, surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, and munition storage sites were struck with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI. In addition, the air campaign was supplemented by large, coordinated missile salvos. Within the first couple months of the conflict, Russia had fired more missiles against Ukraine than any country had employed in a war since World War II.

https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/pu...e%20assets.