[Goose]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

<snip>

I found these links quite relevant, but I had to cut them from the quote due to length. They are appreciated.
 
I don't think we are actually disagreeing about events. As you say, Russia attacked Ukrainian air defenses and airbases in the opening phases. However, these attacks were executed at the same time the "ground war" started. These are the "suppression missions" I refer to. Russia did not attempt SEAD/DEAD as a preamble to their combined arms attack. They were concomitant operations. Russia hit empty airfields because Ukraine knew they were coming. Where we disagree is the "goal" of the Russian air activity. I am sure that Russia would have loved to achieve air supremacy or superiority if it occurred as a result of their suppression operations. They may have well expected that it would. However their "goal", in keeping with Russian doctrine, was to prevent the Ukrainian air force from interfering with the contemporaneous ground war. They did not need to control the air, but they had to ensure Ukraine didn't control it either.

Russia with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI.

That isn't "SEAD/DEAD" as such. That is simply Tac Air. This is entirely consistent with Russian doctrine. The mission objective of the VKS was to prevent the UAF from interfering with the Russian ground force attack. Such air operations only peripherally interfered with the UAF's general ability to defend its airspace against the VKS. The distinction is not just semantics. Russia intended to use VKS to expedite the ability of the ground forces to advance and fight the Ukrainian ground forces. That is the battle Russia wants to fight and where they believed they had the advantage. The US OTOH intends to first use their air forces to create the conditions that will allow those air forces to subsequently at will destroy the opposing ground forces (and their logistics) from the air. The "ground war" will then be mostly a walk-over. The First Gulf War was an extreme example of this strategic difference, where the air forces bombed the Iraqis for five weeks before the ground attack began. The first step was the DEAD plan for the Iraqi IADS, the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi C3 capabilities. The second step was the attrition of Iraqi ground forces. Only then did the ground war start.
 
Nothing like that happened in Ukraine, partly because Russia was depending on surprise as a major weapon but mostly because Russia intended that its ground forces would win the war by defeating the Ukrainian ground forces. In order to do that, Russia had to prevent the Ukrainian air forces from intervening in the ground war. That was their goal. Obviously Russia couldn't just ignore the Ukrainian air force. However they would have been perfectly happy with a stalemate in the air. They basically got that. What messed them up was that their ground forces weren't all they were cracked up to be and Ukraine's were much better than Russia expected.

Russian air doctrine (and NATO air doctrine) was heavily influenced during the Cold War by very clear eyed evaluation of how a war in Europe might play out. NATO knew that the Warsaw Pact forces would initially outnumber them greatly and would probably still outnumber them even after all the US troops arrived in Europe. NATO would be fighting a delaying action until they were reinforced. The plan was to use a technologically superior air arm to help slow down the Russian advance. This would be accomplished by both tactical and strategic aircraft. As the Russian supply lines got longer the air force would have more effect on Russian logistics and bring the Russian advance to a halt through combined defensive efforts and attrition of Russian logistics. Then the technologically superior air power would isolate the Russian spearhead and weaken it to the point it could be destroyed. To do that, NATO would need air superiority followed by air supremacy over the Russian ground forces and Russian logistics tail, at least locally.
 
Russia actually bough into a lot of the NATO concepts. The Russian were concerned with the technological superiority of the NATO aircraft. They were particularly concerned with nuclear attack by strategic bombers but were also very concerned about defending their own ground forces. The PVO was responsible for this duty. It had an absolutely massive number of aircraft whose mission was entirely defensive in nature. They operated under strict Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) rules. The number of sorties these forces could generate was mind-boggling. The PVO was expected to maintain air supremacy over Russian ground forces. The "offensive" part of the air force, the VVS was much smaller. It consisted of strategic bombers and fighter-bombers. As a reference, SU-25s were part of the VVS. The VVS was expected to provide ground support to Russian troops. The VVS would attack NATO missile sites and defend against NATO aircraft as necessary to allow these ground support missions. The VVS would also execute bombing attacks against NATO strategic air bases. The VVS was neither equipped or resourced to seize and maintain air supremacy over NATO ground troops. They were to get in and get out (if they could). Not all that much was expected of them. Note that the VVS did not at that time have air superiority fighters designed to "go after" NATO air and clear the sky.
 
The PVO is gone now, but the thinking remains. The successor VKS is primarily defensive. Note that the VVS as it exists today is a result of a merger between the PVO and the former VVS. They ensure the Russian ground troops aren't destroyed from the air. Any offensive action from them has always been a bonus. https://dupuyinstitute.org/2022/06/16/vv...periority/ is IMO a good explanation of this situation. It points out how the current VVS views the situation.

If they could achieve Air Superiority in the Western sense, they wouldn’t know what to do with it.  They don’t understand it, and don’t care about it.

[Goose]

Russia had no "plan" to destroy the Ukrainian air defenses. They flew a few suppression missions accompanying their initial attacks, but unlike the IAF Russia had no "softening up"  missions with BDA and re-attack as needed. Russia was heavily relying on surprise, so such missions were not possible. That is why they had un-escorted IL-76s flying paratroopers into the teeth of a Ukrainian air defense network that still functioned. Subsequently, Russia's lack of any SEAD capability was on full display. After heavy losses, the VKS effectively left the war for quit awhile.

This is untrue. Russia clearly tried to achieve air supremacy and attacked Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airbases in the opening phases. They had a plan, their plan just failed because Ukraine dispersed well, they had a very extensive existing air defense network, and Russian missiles were not very accurate.

Initially, the Russian military seemed to pursue an air campaign that attempted to achieve air superiority, which generally aligned with Western expectations. The Russian Air Force launched hundreds of sorties into Ukraine during the first three days to attack air defenses and destroy Ukraine aircraft on the ground. Initial news reports said Russia’s “overwhelming air superiority” enabled it to destroy most of Ukraine’s air defenses and air force.

<snip>

I found these links quite relevant, but I had to cut them from the quote due to length. They are appreciated.
 
I don't think we are actually disagreeing about events. As you say, Russia attacked Ukrainian air defenses and airbases in the opening phases. However, these attacks were executed at the same time the "ground war" started. These are the "suppression missions" I refer to. Russia did not attempt SEAD/DEAD as a preamble to their combined arms attack. They were concomitant operations. Russia hit empty airfields because Ukraine knew they were coming. Where we disagree is the "goal" of the Russian air activity. I am sure that Russia would have loved to achieve air supremacy or superiority if it occurred as a result of their suppression operations. They may have well expected that it would. However their "goal", in keeping with Russian doctrine, was to prevent the Ukrainian air force from interfering with the contemporaneous ground war. They did not need to control the air, but they had to ensure Ukraine didn't control it either.

Russia with an effort to remove such facilities “along the routes intended to be used” by advancing Russian forces, according to an analysis by RUSI.

That isn't "SEAD/DEAD" as such. That is simply Tac Air. This is entirely consistent with Russian doctrine. The mission objective of the VKS was to prevent the UAF from interfering with the Russian ground force attack. Such air operations only peripherally interfered with the UAF's general ability to defend its airspace against the VKS. The distinction is not just semantics. Russia intended to use VKS to expedite the ability of the ground forces to advance and fight the Ukrainian ground forces. That is the battle Russia wants to fight and where they believed they had the advantage. The US OTOH intends to first use their air forces to create the conditions that will allow those air forces to subsequently at will destroy the opposing ground forces (and their logistics) from the air. The "ground war" will then be mostly a walk-over. The First Gulf War was an extreme example of this strategic difference, where the air forces bombed the Iraqis for five weeks before the ground attack began. The first step was the DEAD plan for the Iraqi IADS, the Iraqi air force and the Iraqi C3 capabilities. The second step was the attrition of Iraqi ground forces. Only then did the ground war start.
 
Nothing like that happened in Ukraine, partly because Russia was depending on surprise as a major weapon but mostly because Russia intended that its ground forces would win the war by defeating the Ukrainian ground forces. In order to do that, Russia had to prevent the Ukrainian air forces from intervening in the ground war. That was their goal. Obviously Russia couldn't just ignore the Ukrainian air force. However they would have been perfectly happy with a stalemate in the air. They basically got that. What messed them up was that their ground forces weren't all they were cracked up to be and Ukraine's were much better than Russia expected.

Russian air doctrine (and NATO air doctrine) was heavily influenced during the Cold War by very clear eyed evaluation of how a war in Europe might play out. NATO knew that the Warsaw Pact forces would initially outnumber them greatly and would probably still outnumber them even after all the US troops arrived in Europe. NATO would be fighting a delaying action until they were reinforced. The plan was to use a technologically superior air arm to help slow down the Russian advance. This would be accomplished by both tactical and strategic aircraft. As the Russian supply lines got longer the air force would have more effect on Russian logistics and bring the Russian advance to a halt through combined defensive efforts and attrition of Russian logistics. Then the technologically superior air power would isolate the Russian spearhead and weaken it to the point it could be destroyed. To do that, NATO would need air superiority followed by air supremacy over the Russian ground forces and Russian logistics tail, at least locally.
 
Russia actually bough into a lot of the NATO concepts. The Russian were concerned with the technological superiority of the NATO aircraft. They were particularly concerned with nuclear attack by strategic bombers but were also very concerned about defending their own ground forces. The PVO was responsible for this duty. It had an absolutely massive number of aircraft whose mission was entirely defensive in nature. They operated under strict Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) rules. The number of sorties these forces could generate was mind-boggling. The PVO was expected to maintain air supremacy over Russian ground forces. The "offensive" part of the air force, the VVS was much smaller. It consisted of strategic bombers and fighter-bombers. As a reference, SU-25s were part of the VVS. The VVS was expected to provide ground support to Russian troops. The VVS would attack NATO missile sites and defend against NATO aircraft as necessary to allow these ground support missions. The VVS would also execute bombing attacks against NATO strategic air bases. The VVS was neither equipped or resourced to seize and maintain air supremacy over NATO ground troops. They were to get in and get out (if they could). Not all that much was expected of them. Note that the VVS did not at that time have air superiority fighters designed to "go after" NATO air and clear the sky.
 
The PVO is gone now, but the thinking remains. The successor VKS is primarily defensive. Note that the VVS as it exists today is a result of a merger between the PVO and the former VVS. They ensure the Russian ground troops aren't destroyed from the air. Any offensive action from them has always been a bonus. https://dupuyinstitute.org/2022/06/16/vv...periority/ is IMO a good explanation of this situation. It points out how the current VVS views the situation.

If they could achieve Air Superiority in the Western sense, they wouldn’t know what to do with it.  They don’t understand it, and don’t care about it.