[GK3]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

On paper, NATO should dominate Russia.  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293...omparison/
The airpower difference is extraordinary.  My guess the NATO air forces are probably better prepared to fight than the ground forces. 
Considering obvious targets, NATO defense industries are probably much more distributed that the Russian version and it could be much easier to hurt Russian production. 
From what I have read, Russia is thought to be able to produce 150 to 250 new tanks a year.  They have lost almost almost 11,000 tanks in the Ukraine, a staggering number. Their losses in APC's and artillery are equally staggering.  How many relatively modern main battle tanks do they have left?  Today, the Russian infantry do not have to worry about opposing airpower making their chose riding place a very unsafe place to be. 

As you point out, the political will of the NATO countries will be critical. That question may not be answered until a war has actually started. 

As Iran has just shown us, you can have what you think is a robust air defense system only to see it made worthless in short order.  

Plus Putin is not a young man. Would his successor embrace his goals?

There are so many what ifs, maybe's and political questions that we are just engaging in what theoretical maybe's which are interesting to think about, but don't solve much.

Even though I am old army guy, I saw enough of what combined airpower, helos and fast movers can do that I still think Russia would have a hard time combating the NATO advantage in this area.

One other thing, Poland seems to be buying South Korean K2 tanks now, now M1's. The K2 has certain advantages over the M1, but it still seems to me that the latest M1 is perhaps better suited to a European conflict on flat ground.

[GK3]

Yes, back in the day the Bundeswehr was a seriously capable military force.  Now not so much, but they seem to possibly be recognizing this deficiency and are "apparently" willing to invest a lot of DM's into fixing it, time will tell.

I agree that right now Germany is willing to invest lots (relatively speaking) of money in strengthening their military. My concern is the tenor of German society. Since the end of the Cold War Germany has adopted an almost anti-military stanse. Part of that ethos was "Don't scare the Bear", which was adopted enthusiastically by (particularly the young) German society. Right now most of German society doesn't want to have a military at all. They are still emotionally in a state of denial, despite the events in Ukraine having raised intellectual awareness in some circles. To make the Bundeswehr the  force it used to be Germany needs troops. Getting those troops is going to be very, very difficult, if it is even possible. UMT is not politically possible in the near future, if ever. Even if Germany can raise their force levels it will be composed of individuals who lack the socially instilled military duty/ethos German troops possessed during the Cold War. The large cadre of professional, experienced, extremely competent and highly motivated NCOs that use to make the Bundeswehr "work" no longer exists. These are my real worries about the German military reconstituting itself.

My comments regarding what would happen today in a NATO vs Russia conflict is predicated on the a couple of very possibly erroneous beliefs. Russia has not shown any ability to really dominate the airspace over Ukraine. I believe that NATO countries have invested far more money in Airpower than any other force doctrine. I do not see how Russia could invade NATO and also control the airspace above the front lines.

IMO you are correct. Russia can't control the air above the front lines in such a conflict. They probably can't do so behind their own lines either. This is a big difference from the situation in Ukraine. Back in the day the PVO was simply immense. The Russian GCI approach wasn't flashy but it would have made NATO interdiction efforts difficult. All that is gone. Russia has an air force, but nothing like what the Soviets had. Russia relies on SAMs and their IADS to protect their rear areas. As Israel recently demonstrated that won't work against an air force that understands SEAD and has stealthy aircraft to execute the mission. Granted, Iran isn't Russia. Russia would be a tougher nut to crack, but crack it would. We wouldn't get away without losses though, as Israel did. https://www.yahoo.com/news/israel-showed...02706.html is worth a look.

As you say, Russia entire ethos has a long history based on a willingness to suffer and to tolerate and overcome great suffering. Whether that is a sufficient asset to allow them to defeat NATO is doubtful.  I think that Poland and the Baltic States figure that if Russia comes West then the rest of NATO will fight a delaying action while they call up reserves and put together a combined force.  In the meantime, Poland and the Baltic States are sort of on their own.  I do not think any of them will go quietly into the good night.

I agree with the last sentence for sure! I also don't think Russia can use the tactics they are employing in Ukraine with any success in a general full-scale engagement against NATO. However Russia has other options that attack NATO's distributed nature. The Baltic States are small enough that Russia may be able to swallow them quickly if NATO isn't 1) meaningfully forward deployed in the Baltics and 2) prepared to very quickly reinforce the Baltics. Right now, it is unclear NATO is capable of doing either and even less clear NATO has the political will to do so. If Russia states limited war aims and refrains from deep strikes into other NATO nations while attacking the Baltics, what will NATO do? IMO if the US does not actively enter into the conflict on essentially day one, no other NATO nation will either. NATO is quite capable of allowing a Russian victory by being stupid.
 
That is why it was critical that the US commitment to collective defense be (at least publicly) unconditional. If we reserve the right to question involvement on a case-by-case basis, so can everybody else. At a minimum, this process creates delay and uncertainty. In war, both can be fatal.
 
Air superiority wise, China is a different case entirely. Probably too off topic for this thread however.

On another subject, your comments on WWII and the "what if" regarding the German Operations in Russia is very well taken.  If Germany had done as you suggest, D Day may never have happened. England might have been taken by Germany.  Lots of interesting "what ifs".  

While I am not in favor of our reduced support for Ukraine, it has had the positive effect of forcing NATO countries to become far more proactive in building up their forces.  Better late than never I think.

I am much less sanguine than you are about the long-term willingness of the NATO countries to strengthen themselves militarily. The politics of most of the NATO countries lean much more toward social welfare expenses than military expenses. We in the US have been trending in that direction as well. The US however has been a "superpower" for quite awhile and at least a significant part of the public "likes" that. Most NATO nations aren't interested in any such role and the few that might conceivably be (UK, France, Germany) can't afford the cost. It is unlikely Britain or France ever could. Their nuclear deterrent is their "safety net". The UK Army And the RN are vanishingly small and getting smaller. The French Army in the past 35 years has "tracked" the German army in size. I think there was a message in that. Germany right now is having some serious economic problems. They aren't the "powerhouse" they have been. That will affect their willingness and ability to rebuild their forces. I am more worried about their willingness :-).

On paper, NATO should dominate Russia.  https://www.statista.com/statistics/1293...omparison/
The airpower difference is extraordinary.  My guess the NATO air forces are probably better prepared to fight than the ground forces. 
Considering obvious targets, NATO defense industries are probably much more distributed that the Russian version and it could be much easier to hurt Russian production. 
From what I have read, Russia is thought to be able to produce 150 to 250 new tanks a year.  They have lost almost almost 11,000 tanks in the Ukraine, a staggering number. Their losses in APC's and artillery are equally staggering.  How many relatively modern main battle tanks do they have left?  Today, the Russian infantry do not have to worry about opposing airpower making their chose riding place a very unsafe place to be. 

As you point out, the political will of the NATO countries will be critical. That question may not be answered until a war has actually started. 

As Iran has just shown us, you can have what you think is a robust air defense system only to see it made worthless in short order.  

Plus Putin is not a young man. Would his successor embrace his goals?

There are so many what ifs, maybe's and political questions that we are just engaging in what theoretical maybe's which are interesting to think about, but don't solve much.

Even though I am old army guy, I saw enough of what combined airpower, helos and fast movers can do that I still think Russia would have a hard time combating the NATO advantage in this area.

One other thing, Poland seems to be buying South Korean K2 tanks now, now M1's. The K2 has certain advantages over the M1, but it still seems to me that the latest M1 is perhaps better suited to a European conflict on flat ground.