07-10-2025, 08:28 PM
(07-09-2025, 06:28 PM)GK3 Wrote: I would expect that if Russia masses sufficient assets close to the Baltic/Poland borders, it will not be a secret to NATO.Probably you are correct. However, stranger things have happened. Both Poland and Russia in WW II saw the German army massing on their border and did next to nothing in response. Even Ukraine didn't believe Russia was going to attack them. If they had, the defensive forces in Kherson Oblast would not have been on maneuvers on the right bank of the river and about as far west as you can go.
Quote:The "Trip Wire" forces in Poland/Baltic states will be in a difficult position. Whether they function as the "trip wire" that allows Article 5 to be invoked and positive responses is as of today unknown. Once Article 5 is invoked we shall see what happens.The assumption is that the hostage forces will be immediately engaged by the Russians and therefore start fighting to defend themselves. The theory is that in so doing they will commit their nations to fight Russia. This would of necessity occur immediately irrespective of any Article 5 invocation. Of course, if Russia carefully avoids attacking these forces, what do they do? Do they have orders to execute a warplan? I very much doubt it. Article 5 can be invoked at any time, including before hostilities start. While this would seem to be an ideal way to deter an impending attack, IMO most NATO nations will not commit to defend former Warsaw Pact members (or the Baltics) in advance of any actual hostile action by Russia. It would not be politically possible. They will wait.
Quote:I also believe that we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans to be sufficient to give us dominance of the airspace over the resulting battlefield. Allowing us to bring up ground forces and fight the war in the Poland/Baltic States arena. Not a pretty picture if you live in those areas.I agree we anticipate that our SEAD/DEAD plans will eventually give us dominance of the airspace, including Russian GLOCs. The key word is eventually. First of all, if the NATO air forces do not go into battle almost immediately the delay in starting to fight will add to the non-trivial delay it takes to "sanitize" the battle space. During that time, Russia gets the opportunity to fight a token hostage force that may not have clear orders to resist. At least the 750 troops in the Berlin Brigade knew what they were supposed to do. The orders were clear and unequivocal. Back in the 1980s it was a given that the US, UK, and BRD forces would begin executing their warplan without any "political" hesitation. If France shows up within 24 hours, it would be a bonus. No Article 5, no phone calls to London/DC/Bonn. Instant war. With luck all the BRD reserve soldiers would have already joined their units as a precaution. 2 ACR, the "speed bump", expected to retain the south shoulder of the Fulda Gap from the first instant until there was nobody left. Russia faces nothing like that today. Worst case, they will be fairly deep into their objectives before NATO engages with "serious" forces. Given that, will the NATO countries even attempt to eject them? In the 1980s, the answer was very clear. Today, it is not.
Quote:My questions will our DEAD plans work? If we can't dominate the airspace we will have some issues. The first of which will be does NATO mean anything at all.FWVLIW IMO our SEAD/DEAD plans will work. We have seen this scenario before and practice against it. Russia has few if any surprises in terms of air or ground weapons. I would not be saying this if our opponent were China. Russia is unfortunately a relatively unstable country. If Putin starts to loose, he may do almost anything. I fear that, and I also fear that NATO has not made it clear enough to Putin what we will or will not consider casus belli. IMO that is because our political class doesn't know either. During the Cold War, they did. No longer. A miscalculation by Putin is very, very possible. A delay in acting by NATO can also create a situation that fighting Russia becomes simply "too hard to do". If Russia already occupies most of the targeted country, is it worth the war it will take to eject them? For many countries, possibly most, IMO the answer will be "no". Those countries may include the US.
