https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/russ...33187.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/russ...30309.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...27150.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...02126.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crklljyx6mzo
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...er-crisis/
Indeed it looks like the end is near in Pokrovsk. If it is approximately true that there are about 300 Russian troops in the city one would think Ukraine would simply commit an infantry battalion (500-600 troops) to winkle out the Russians. The Russian troops are infiltrators and probably not concentrated into groups larger than platoons, if that. The Ukrainian infantry could easily gain overwhelming local superiority and eliminate these groups one at a time. That hasn't happened.
IMO there are a combination of factors involved. First, Ukraine probably doesn't have a "reserve" infantry battalion to commit. It would of necessity have to come from nearby because Ukrainian infantry is quite immobile. This lack of reserves is mostly due to the ongoing troop shortage in the Ukrainian military. According to Zelenskyy Ukraine is outnumbered 8 to 1 in this battle area. Second, such an operation would cause relatively high casualties in the battalion doing it. Ukraine can't afford high casualties unless there is an adequate reward. Third, a battalion (if you could scrounge one up) would have no easy access into and out of Pokrovsk. Apparently Russia has control by fire of most (all?) the ways in and out. The battalion may not ever make it into the battle before it is rendered combat ineffective. If the battalion makes it in but the battle is subsequently lost they may be impossible to withdraw. If they do make it in supplying them will be difficult at best. Thus, IMO the whole area around Pokrovsk as well as Pokrovsk itself is effectively lost. What we are currently seeing is a rear-guard action. Hopefully Ukraine will not suffer too many KIA/WIA/POWs as a result.
The value of Pokrovsk as a key hub on supply lines for the rest of eastern Donetsk and the "fortress belt" has been gone for a while now, as Russia had effectively cut it weeks ago. The question of what the alleged 170,000 Russian troops are going to "do" after the fall of Pokrovsk is an interesting one. If Russia had a "normal" military one would expect the 170,000 troops would include one or more exploitation forces that would pass through the Russian troops in the Pokrovsk area and "exploit" the assumed disarray, immobility and lack of fallback positions for the Ukrainian forces. They would have the objective of "bouncing" the entire fortress belt in one go. Based on recent past experience one doubts the Russians are capable of that. It also depends on how much disarray Ukraine is actually exhibiting. In the recent past Ukraine has proved resilient. Eventually though the Russian manpower advantage will grind them down. Is that time now? We shall see.
At this point there continues to be a race between Russian brute force infantry advances plus continual missile attacks on the Ukrainian population vs Ukrainian drone destruction of Russian POL facilities and EU/US sanctions on Russian POL exports. How long can Ukraine hold on? How long before the Russian government runs out of capital, both financial and political?
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/russ...30309.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...27150.html
https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...02126.html
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crklljyx6mzo
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...er-crisis/
Indeed it looks like the end is near in Pokrovsk. If it is approximately true that there are about 300 Russian troops in the city one would think Ukraine would simply commit an infantry battalion (500-600 troops) to winkle out the Russians. The Russian troops are infiltrators and probably not concentrated into groups larger than platoons, if that. The Ukrainian infantry could easily gain overwhelming local superiority and eliminate these groups one at a time. That hasn't happened.
IMO there are a combination of factors involved. First, Ukraine probably doesn't have a "reserve" infantry battalion to commit. It would of necessity have to come from nearby because Ukrainian infantry is quite immobile. This lack of reserves is mostly due to the ongoing troop shortage in the Ukrainian military. According to Zelenskyy Ukraine is outnumbered 8 to 1 in this battle area. Second, such an operation would cause relatively high casualties in the battalion doing it. Ukraine can't afford high casualties unless there is an adequate reward. Third, a battalion (if you could scrounge one up) would have no easy access into and out of Pokrovsk. Apparently Russia has control by fire of most (all?) the ways in and out. The battalion may not ever make it into the battle before it is rendered combat ineffective. If the battalion makes it in but the battle is subsequently lost they may be impossible to withdraw. If they do make it in supplying them will be difficult at best. Thus, IMO the whole area around Pokrovsk as well as Pokrovsk itself is effectively lost. What we are currently seeing is a rear-guard action. Hopefully Ukraine will not suffer too many KIA/WIA/POWs as a result.
The value of Pokrovsk as a key hub on supply lines for the rest of eastern Donetsk and the "fortress belt" has been gone for a while now, as Russia had effectively cut it weeks ago. The question of what the alleged 170,000 Russian troops are going to "do" after the fall of Pokrovsk is an interesting one. If Russia had a "normal" military one would expect the 170,000 troops would include one or more exploitation forces that would pass through the Russian troops in the Pokrovsk area and "exploit" the assumed disarray, immobility and lack of fallback positions for the Ukrainian forces. They would have the objective of "bouncing" the entire fortress belt in one go. Based on recent past experience one doubts the Russians are capable of that. It also depends on how much disarray Ukraine is actually exhibiting. In the recent past Ukraine has proved resilient. Eventually though the Russian manpower advantage will grind them down. Is that time now? We shall see.
At this point there continues to be a race between Russian brute force infantry advances plus continual missile attacks on the Ukrainian population vs Ukrainian drone destruction of Russian POL facilities and EU/US sanctions on Russian POL exports. How long can Ukraine hold on? How long before the Russian government runs out of capital, both financial and political?