[TrumpCard]

The U.S. now also approving anti-personnel mines in addition to the more flexible ATACAM usage.  Would this be at the request of the new administration to effectuate anticipated policies in advance of the transition?  Or is this more in the realm of, "I didn't want to approve this sooner because I could be blamed for escalation, but now, screw it, any escalation is the next guy's fault."

[TrumpCard]

The U.S. now also approving anti-personnel mines in addition to the more flexible ATACAM usage.  Would this be at the request of the new administration to effectuate anticipated policies in advance of the transition?  Or is this more in the realm of, "I didn't want to approve this sooner because I could be blamed for escalation, but now, screw it, any escalation is the next guy's fault."

[Goose]

The U.S. now also approving anti-personnel mines in addition to the more flexible ATACAM usage.  Would this be at the request of the new administration to effectuate anticipated policies in advance of the transition?  Or is this more in the realm of, "I didn't want to approve this sooner because I could be blamed for escalation, but now, screw it, any escalation is the next guy's fault."

No "facts", but IMO it is the latter. The administration, as a lame duck, has no concerns about what the public or the pundits think. I do worry about sending Ukraine a significant number of anti-personnel mines. We use a lot of them in Korea, but other than that we have (foolishly IMO) decided we don't need them. We don't have a lot to spare.

[Goose]

The U.S. now also approving anti-personnel mines in addition to the more flexible ATACAM usage.  Would this be at the request of the new administration to effectuate anticipated policies in advance of the transition?  Or is this more in the realm of, "I didn't want to approve this sooner because I could be blamed for escalation, but now, screw it, any escalation is the next guy's fault."

No "facts", but IMO it is the latter. The administration, as a lame duck, has no concerns about what the public or the pundits think. I do worry about sending Ukraine a significant number of anti-personnel mines. We use a lot of them in Korea, but other than that we have (foolishly IMO) decided we don't need them. We don't have a lot to spare.

[M T]

Let’s stay off politics please. I don’t want this thread to be closed.

[M T]

Let’s stay off politics please. I don’t want this thread to be closed.

[Goose]

IMO this is a "must read" article. Unfortunately it is paywalled. The NYT gives great instructions on how to share an article via an app or IOS, but none on how to do so using a web browser. If anybody here can point me to such instructions I would be grateful. Hopefully somebody can gift it to the board.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...3c37a624b#

From this article it is pretty clear Ukraine is running out of troops. There is also a lack of NCOs to lead the new units being created. Two important quote from the article.

“Nothing can replace infantry,” Captain Viacheslav said, adding that drones “cannot realistically stop the enemy.”

In all the hoopla about what Ukraine can do and has accomplished, the above fact keeps getting lost. It is a very inconvenient fact that it seems most of "the west" has assiduously blocked out. Even the Ukrainians themselves did, not ramping up their conscription adequately during the early years of the war. If you are counting on a "short" war, you better ensure it will be short by winning "quickly". Ukraine was never in a position to do that, especially since the US/EU didn't understand the above and therefore did not resource Ukraine to do that.

“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost nonexistent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”

In any battle firepower can cure a lot of deficiencies. The US "way of war" during and after WW II has been to overwhelm the enemy by fires, both from the air and from the ground. We can destroy fixed defenses, or at the very least force the occupants of the defenses to be ineffective while our troops got "on" the objective. That allowed our forces to minimize casualties while still operating very effectively. The US and EU never even came close to supplying Ukraine enough firepower to do this. Arguably we couldn't, because doing so would significantly weaken our own forces. Even if we could supply all the material, Ukraine would have been hard-put to assimilate it all and quickly conduct an offensive to end the war.

At different times Ukraine planned three significant offensives. The first "planned" Ukrainian offensive eventually forced the Russians to evacuate much of Kherson Oblast and Kherson city itself. Unfortunately the Russians were allowed to do that in good order. Ukraine did not press them and did not "jump" the river immediately. Why was never clear to me, but it undoubtedly because they felt they didn't have the combat power to do it. This allowed Russia to retain Nova Kakhovka and eventually blow the dam.

There Ukraine almost contemporaneously executed an offensive in the northeast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Khark...roffensive. It was was very successful. It succeeded because the Russians had too few troops and no fortified lines of defense. The Wikipedia article tries to make it sound like part of the plan, but it was not. It was a serendipity. It was a local initiative utilizing only troops that were already defending in the area. There was a three-day pause in the exploitation because it was a "happening" and there was no plan to exploit such a breakthrough. Unfortunately it wasn't in an area that Russia had to "hold" in order to continue the war.

The second planned offensive a year later failed because Ukraine had no means of quickly breaking through the extensive Russian fortifications. This failure was due to several factors. The US and EU failed to supply the promised mine clearing materials. The minefields had to be slowly lifted by hand, forcing the troops intended for the breakthrough to remain in the Russian "kill zone" much too long. The Ukrainians also had insufficient indirect fire capability to suppress the extensive concrete fortifications Russia was allowed to build. These fortifications allowed Russia to attrit the Ukrainian offensive significantly. To their credit Ukraine did finally break through these fortifications. Unfortunately Russia had built two lines of defense plus many "hedgehog" fortifications further back. The Russians also then started using a tactically significant force of helicopters which was quite effective against advancing Ukrainian forces. At that point the Ukrainians were a spent force and the offensive failed to reach even its first objectives.

So here we are. The military way forward for Ukraine today is unclear. The recent planned offensive into Kursk Oblast "worked" largely because the border was very poorly defended (as did the successful offensive in the northeast). It was well planned and well executed. It was an example of hitting a "soft spot" where Russia had no extensive fortified lines. It has diverted significant but not crippling numbers of Russian troops into that battle. Had the offensive gone all the way to Kursk city it might have won the war. It was never planned to do that and has far too troops to even attempt such an advance.

Ukraine has submitted a plan to win the war. It requires lots of actions by the west and NATO that simply aren't going to happen, even best case. Can another plan be made that will "work"? Can Ukraine hold on long enough for such a plan to be executed? Lots of questions, few answers.

[Goose]

IMO this is a "must read" article. Unfortunately it is paywalled. The NYT gives great instructions on how to share an article via an app or IOS, but none on how to do so using a web browser. If anybody here can point me to such instructions I would be grateful. Hopefully somebody can gift it to the board.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...3c37a624b#

From this article it is pretty clear Ukraine is running out of troops. There is also a lack of NCOs to lead the new units being created. Two important quote from the article.

“Nothing can replace infantry,” Captain Viacheslav said, adding that drones “cannot realistically stop the enemy.”

In all the hoopla about what Ukraine can do and has accomplished, the above fact keeps getting lost. It is a very inconvenient fact that it seems most of "the west" has assiduously blocked out. Even the Ukrainians themselves did, not ramping up their conscription adequately during the early years of the war. If you are counting on a "short" war, you better ensure it will be short by winning "quickly". Ukraine was never in a position to do that, especially since the US/EU didn't understand the above and therefore did not resource Ukraine to do that.

“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost nonexistent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”

In any battle firepower can cure a lot of deficiencies. The US "way of war" during and after WW II has been to overwhelm the enemy by fires, both from the air and from the ground. We can destroy fixed defenses, or at the very least force the occupants of the defenses to be ineffective while our troops got "on" the objective. That allowed our forces to minimize casualties while still operating very effectively. The US and EU never even came close to supplying Ukraine enough firepower to do this. Arguably we couldn't, because doing so would significantly weaken our own forces. Even if we could supply all the material, Ukraine would have been hard-put to assimilate it all and quickly conduct an offensive to end the war.

At different times Ukraine planned three significant offensives. The first "planned" Ukrainian offensive eventually forced the Russians to evacuate much of Kherson Oblast and Kherson city itself. Unfortunately the Russians were allowed to do that in good order. Ukraine did not press them and did not "jump" the river immediately. Why was never clear to me, but it undoubtedly because they felt they didn't have the combat power to do it. This allowed Russia to retain Nova Kakhovka and eventually blow the dam.

There Ukraine almost contemporaneously executed an offensive in the northeast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Khark...roffensive. It was was very successful. It succeeded because the Russians had too few troops and no fortified lines of defense. The Wikipedia article tries to make it sound like part of the plan, but it was not. It was a serendipity. It was a local initiative utilizing only troops that were already defending in the area. There was a three-day pause in the exploitation because it was a "happening" and there was no plan to exploit such a breakthrough. Unfortunately it wasn't in an area that Russia had to "hold" in order to continue the war.

The second planned offensive a year later failed because Ukraine had no means of quickly breaking through the extensive Russian fortifications. This failure was due to several factors. The US and EU failed to supply the promised mine clearing materials. The minefields had to be slowly lifted by hand, forcing the troops intended for the breakthrough to remain in the Russian "kill zone" much too long. The Ukrainians also had insufficient indirect fire capability to suppress the extensive concrete fortifications Russia was allowed to build. These fortifications allowed Russia to attrit the Ukrainian offensive significantly. To their credit Ukraine did finally break through these fortifications. Unfortunately Russia had built two lines of defense plus many "hedgehog" fortifications further back. The Russians also then started using a tactically significant force of helicopters which was quite effective against advancing Ukrainian forces. At that point the Ukrainians were a spent force and the offensive failed to reach even its first objectives.

So here we are. The military way forward for Ukraine today is unclear. The recent planned offensive into Kursk Oblast "worked" largely because the border was very poorly defended (as did the successful offensive in the northeast). It was well planned and well executed. It was an example of hitting a "soft spot" where Russia had no extensive fortified lines. It has diverted significant but not crippling numbers of Russian troops into that battle. Had the offensive gone all the way to Kursk city it might have won the war. It was never planned to do that and has far too troops to even attempt such an advance.

Ukraine has submitted a plan to win the war. It requires lots of actions by the west and NATO that simply aren't going to happen, even best case. Can another plan be made that will "work"? Can Ukraine hold on long enough for such a plan to be executed? Lots of questions, few answers.

[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine...a-f704f05b

Now we know. The UK has given approval and Ukraine has acted. I would assume France and the SCALP missiles are also in play.

[Goose]

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukraine...a-f704f05b

Now we know. The UK has given approval and Ukraine has acted. I would assume France and the SCALP missiles are also in play.

[MV72018]

IMO this is a "must read" article. Unfortunately it is paywalled. The NYT gives great instructions on how to share an article via an app or IOS, but none on how to do so using a web browser. If anybody here can point me to such instructions I would be grateful. Hopefully somebody can gift it to the board.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...3c37a624b#

From this article it is pretty clear Ukraine is running out of troops. There is also a lack of NCOs to lead the new units being created. Two important quote from the article.

“Nothing can replace infantry,” Captain Viacheslav said, adding that drones “cannot realistically stop the enemy.”

In all the hoopla about what Ukraine can do and has accomplished, the above fact keeps getting lost. It is a very inconvenient fact that it seems most of "the west" has assiduously blocked out. Even the Ukrainians themselves did, not ramping up their conscription adequately during the early years of the war. If you are counting on a "short" war, you better ensure it will be short by winning "quickly". Ukraine was never in a position to do that, especially since the US/EU didn't understand the above and therefore did not resource Ukraine to do that.

“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost nonexistent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”

In any battle firepower can cure a lot of deficiencies. The US "way of war" during and after WW II has been to overwhelm the enemy by fires, both from the air and from the ground. We can destroy fixed defenses, or at the very least force the occupants of the defenses to be ineffective while our troops got "on" the objective. That allowed our forces to minimize casualties while still operating very effectively. The US and EU never even came close to supplying Ukraine enough firepower to do this. Arguably we couldn't, because doing so would significantly weaken our own forces. Even if we could supply all the material, Ukraine would have been hard-put to assimilate it all and quickly conduct an offensive to end the war.

At different times Ukraine planned three significant offensives. The first "planned" Ukrainian offensive eventually forced the Russians to evacuate much of Kherson Oblast and Kherson city itself. Unfortunately the Russians were allowed to do that in good order. Ukraine did not press them and did not "jump" the river immediately. Why was never clear to me, but it undoubtedly because they felt they didn't have the combat power to do it. This allowed Russia to retain Nova Kakhovka and eventually blow the dam.

There Ukraine almost contemporaneously executed an offensive in the northeast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Khark...roffensive. It was was very successful. It succeeded because the Russians had too few troops and no fortified lines of defense. The Wikipedia article tries to make it sound like part of the plan, but it was not. It was a serendipity. It was a local initiative utilizing only troops that were already defending in the area. There was a three-day pause in the exploitation because it was a "happening" and there was no plan to exploit such a breakthrough. Unfortunately it wasn't in an area that Russia had to "hold" in order to continue the war.

The second planned offensive a year later failed because Ukraine had no means of quickly breaking through the extensive Russian fortifications. This failure was due to several factors. The US and EU failed to supply the promised mine clearing materials. The minefields had to be slowly lifted by hand, forcing the troops intended for the breakthrough to remain in the Russian "kill zone" much too long. The Ukrainians also had insufficient indirect fire capability to suppress the extensive concrete fortifications Russia was allowed to build. These fortifications allowed Russia to attrit the Ukrainian offensive significantly. To their credit Ukraine did finally break through these fortifications. Unfortunately Russia had built two lines of defense plus many "hedgehog" fortifications further back. The Russians also then started using a tactically significant force of helicopters which was quite effective against advancing Ukrainian forces. At that point the Ukrainians were a spent force and the offensive failed to reach even its first objectives.

So here we are. The military way forward for Ukraine today is unclear. The recent planned offensive into Kursk Oblast "worked" largely because the border was very poorly defended (as did the successful offensive in the northeast). It was well planned and well executed. It was an example of hitting a "soft spot" where Russia had no extensive fortified lines. It has diverted significant but not crippling numbers of Russian troops into that battle. Had the offensive gone all the way to Kursk city it might have won the war. It was never planned to do that and has far too troops to even attempt such an advance.

Ukraine has submitted a plan to win the war. It requires lots of actions by the west and NATO that simply aren't going to happen, even best case. Can another plan be made that will "work"? Can Ukraine hold on long enough for such a plan to be executed? Lots of questions, few answers.

Goose, just go to the end of the article, right after it says, "Read 227 comments," and click on "Share full article." The rest is straightforward. MV72018

[MV72018]

IMO this is a "must read" article. Unfortunately it is paywalled. The NYT gives great instructions on how to share an article via an app or IOS, but none on how to do so using a web browser. If anybody here can point me to such instructions I would be grateful. Hopefully somebody can gift it to the board.
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...3c37a624b#

From this article it is pretty clear Ukraine is running out of troops. There is also a lack of NCOs to lead the new units being created. Two important quote from the article.

“Nothing can replace infantry,” Captain Viacheslav said, adding that drones “cannot realistically stop the enemy.”

In all the hoopla about what Ukraine can do and has accomplished, the above fact keeps getting lost. It is a very inconvenient fact that it seems most of "the west" has assiduously blocked out. Even the Ukrainians themselves did, not ramping up their conscription adequately during the early years of the war. If you are counting on a "short" war, you better ensure it will be short by winning "quickly". Ukraine was never in a position to do that, especially since the US/EU didn't understand the above and therefore did not resource Ukraine to do that.

“HIMARS — I barely hear them at all anymore. They’re almost nonexistent,” said Sgt. Maj. Dmytro, a 33-year-old drone operator and company leader. “If we had more munitions, it could compensate for the lack of people.”

In any battle firepower can cure a lot of deficiencies. The US "way of war" during and after WW II has been to overwhelm the enemy by fires, both from the air and from the ground. We can destroy fixed defenses, or at the very least force the occupants of the defenses to be ineffective while our troops got "on" the objective. That allowed our forces to minimize casualties while still operating very effectively. The US and EU never even came close to supplying Ukraine enough firepower to do this. Arguably we couldn't, because doing so would significantly weaken our own forces. Even if we could supply all the material, Ukraine would have been hard-put to assimilate it all and quickly conduct an offensive to end the war.

At different times Ukraine planned three significant offensives. The first "planned" Ukrainian offensive eventually forced the Russians to evacuate much of Kherson Oblast and Kherson city itself. Unfortunately the Russians were allowed to do that in good order. Ukraine did not press them and did not "jump" the river immediately. Why was never clear to me, but it undoubtedly because they felt they didn't have the combat power to do it. This allowed Russia to retain Nova Kakhovka and eventually blow the dam.

There Ukraine almost contemporaneously executed an offensive in the northeast https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Khark...roffensive. It was was very successful. It succeeded because the Russians had too few troops and no fortified lines of defense. The Wikipedia article tries to make it sound like part of the plan, but it was not. It was a serendipity. It was a local initiative utilizing only troops that were already defending in the area. There was a three-day pause in the exploitation because it was a "happening" and there was no plan to exploit such a breakthrough. Unfortunately it wasn't in an area that Russia had to "hold" in order to continue the war.

The second planned offensive a year later failed because Ukraine had no means of quickly breaking through the extensive Russian fortifications. This failure was due to several factors. The US and EU failed to supply the promised mine clearing materials. The minefields had to be slowly lifted by hand, forcing the troops intended for the breakthrough to remain in the Russian "kill zone" much too long. The Ukrainians also had insufficient indirect fire capability to suppress the extensive concrete fortifications Russia was allowed to build. These fortifications allowed Russia to attrit the Ukrainian offensive significantly. To their credit Ukraine did finally break through these fortifications. Unfortunately Russia had built two lines of defense plus many "hedgehog" fortifications further back. The Russians also then started using a tactically significant force of helicopters which was quite effective against advancing Ukrainian forces. At that point the Ukrainians were a spent force and the offensive failed to reach even its first objectives.

So here we are. The military way forward for Ukraine today is unclear. The recent planned offensive into Kursk Oblast "worked" largely because the border was very poorly defended (as did the successful offensive in the northeast). It was well planned and well executed. It was an example of hitting a "soft spot" where Russia had no extensive fortified lines. It has diverted significant but not crippling numbers of Russian troops into that battle. Had the offensive gone all the way to Kursk city it might have won the war. It was never planned to do that and has far too troops to even attempt such an advance.

Ukraine has submitted a plan to win the war. It requires lots of actions by the west and NATO that simply aren't going to happen, even best case. Can another plan be made that will "work"? Can Ukraine hold on long enough for such a plan to be executed? Lots of questions, few answers.

Goose, just go to the end of the article, right after it says, "Read 227 comments," and click on "Share full article." The rest is straightforward. MV72018

[Goose]

Goose, just go to the end of the article, right after it says, "Read 227 comments," and click on "Share full article." The rest is straightforward. MV72018

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...=url-share
Thanks! Hopefully it works for others, still does for me!

[Goose]

Goose, just go to the end of the article, right after it says, "Read 227 comments," and click on "Share full article." The rest is straightforward. MV72018

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/20/world...=url-share
Thanks! Hopefully it works for others, still does for me!

[TrumpCard]

Thanks for the article.

[TrumpCard]

Thanks for the article.

[newguy]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

[newguy]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

[Goose]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

The obvious message here is that the next one contains a nuclear warhead. Part of the message is that this is an ICBM. Ukraine can't reach far enough with the weapons it has to stop such launches.

This launch doesn't tell anybody anything they didn't already know about Russia's capabilities. It was designed to indicate intentions, or at least to affect the US (and Ukraine's) analysis of Russia's intentions. To what extent it does that I do not know.

If Russia indeed is contemplating a nuclear response a great time to do it would be immediately before or after the change in administration. Our ability to develop a reasoned response near this transition time may not be all that great. Russia might believe we would be unable to respond. One would hope this has already been hashed out, but I have no idea if it has. I tend to doubt it. Russia needs to be careful with this idea, because it might elicit a response that is not at all what Russia expected. I am not thinking the US would start a nuclear war, but we might do something that would push Russia further into a corner.

[Goose]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

The obvious message here is that the next one contains a nuclear warhead. Part of the message is that this is an ICBM. Ukraine can't reach far enough with the weapons it has to stop such launches.

This launch doesn't tell anybody anything they didn't already know about Russia's capabilities. It was designed to indicate intentions, or at least to affect the US (and Ukraine's) analysis of Russia's intentions. To what extent it does that I do not know.

If Russia indeed is contemplating a nuclear response a great time to do it would be immediately before or after the change in administration. Our ability to develop a reasoned response near this transition time may not be all that great. Russia might believe we would be unable to respond. One would hope this has already been hashed out, but I have no idea if it has. I tend to doubt it. Russia needs to be careful with this idea, because it might elicit a response that is not at all what Russia expected. I am not thinking the US would start a nuclear war, but we might do something that would push Russia further into a corner.

[GK3]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

The obvious message here is that the next one contains a nuclear warhead. Part of the message is that this is an ICBM. Ukraine can't reach far enough with the weapons it has to stop such launches.

This launch doesn't tell anybody anything they didn't already know about Russia's capabilities. It was designed to indicate intentions, or at least to affect the US (and Ukraine's) analysis of Russia's intentions. To what extent it does that I do not know.

If Russia indeed is contemplating a nuclear response a great time to do it would be immediately before or after the change in administration. Our ability to develop a reasoned response near this transition time may not be all that great. Russia might believe we would be unable to respond. One would hope this has already been hashed out, but I have no idea if it has. I tend to doubt it. Russia needs to be careful with this idea, because it might elicit a response that is not at all what Russia expected. I am not thinking the US would start a nuclear war, but we might do something that would push Russia further into a corner.

At this point, no matter what the West does, I do not think Putin can agree to any sort of peace that doesn't give him a large part of Ukraine.  This little expedition has cost Russian brobdingnagian amounts of money, hundred's of thousands of casualties, loss of prestige, and billions of dollars in frozen assets around the world.  Politically, if he agrees to anything short of outright victory, it will have to give him a near victory with everyone assuming a few years down the road he will seize the rest of it.
The West might have stopped the whole thing if they had gone all in for the Ukraine at the beginning. Dribbles and drabs, bids and pieces at a time simply was the wrong approach.

[GK3]

there are reports from Ukraine that an ICBM has been launched aggressively for the first time in history.
it is possible that said missile was not carrying a payload of any kind.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rus...024-11-21/

The obvious message here is that the next one contains a nuclear warhead. Part of the message is that this is an ICBM. Ukraine can't reach far enough with the weapons it has to stop such launches.

This launch doesn't tell anybody anything they didn't already know about Russia's capabilities. It was designed to indicate intentions, or at least to affect the US (and Ukraine's) analysis of Russia's intentions. To what extent it does that I do not know.

If Russia indeed is contemplating a nuclear response a great time to do it would be immediately before or after the change in administration. Our ability to develop a reasoned response near this transition time may not be all that great. Russia might believe we would be unable to respond. One would hope this has already been hashed out, but I have no idea if it has. I tend to doubt it. Russia needs to be careful with this idea, because it might elicit a response that is not at all what Russia expected. I am not thinking the US would start a nuclear war, but we might do something that would push Russia further into a corner.

At this point, no matter what the West does, I do not think Putin can agree to any sort of peace that doesn't give him a large part of Ukraine.  This little expedition has cost Russian brobdingnagian amounts of money, hundred's of thousands of casualties, loss of prestige, and billions of dollars in frozen assets around the world.  Politically, if he agrees to anything short of outright victory, it will have to give him a near victory with everyone assuming a few years down the road he will seize the rest of it.
The West might have stopped the whole thing if they had gone all in for the Ukraine at the beginning. Dribbles and drabs, bids and pieces at a time simply was the wrong approach.

[dabigv13]

The counterfactual is unknowable. If we provided more aid, and more advanced aid, at earlier stages, Russia is probably reacting in a more escalatory manner at that time. Maybe they use a tactical nuclear weapon, which apparently intelligence said had a high probability of happening at the time.

I think we probably could have done more sooner, but important to look at all sides before presuming that the US fumbled this.

The footage of the RVs hitting is pretty chilling. Doesn't seem there was any conventional warhead.

https://x.com/igorlachenkov/status/1859561766646071673

Of course the terror is the point, as this would not be a very good conventional weapon. The RV accuracy too low to destroy any particular target without a nuclear warhead.

[dabigv13]

The counterfactual is unknowable. If we provided more aid, and more advanced aid, at earlier stages, Russia is probably reacting in a more escalatory manner at that time. Maybe they use a tactical nuclear weapon, which apparently intelligence said had a high probability of happening at the time.

I think we probably could have done more sooner, but important to look at all sides before presuming that the US fumbled this.

The footage of the RVs hitting is pretty chilling. Doesn't seem there was any conventional warhead.

https://x.com/igorlachenkov/status/1859561766646071673

Of course the terror is the point, as this would not be a very good conventional weapon. The RV accuracy too low to destroy any particular target without a nuclear warhead.

[Goose]

At this point, no matter what the West does, I do not think Putin can agree to any sort of peace that doesn't give him a large part of Ukraine.  This little expedition has cost Russian brobdingnagian amounts of money, hundred's of thousands of casualties, loss of prestige, and billions of dollars in frozen assets around the world.  Politically, if he agrees to anything short of outright victory, it will have to give him a near victory with everyone assuming a few years down the road he will seize the rest of it.

Or the remaining Ukraine will "freely of its own will" join the Russian federation. Putin also has no reason to settle for less. Once "the west" has made it clear we don't intend to support continued Ukrainian resistance, it becomes a question of time. Probably not much time. Putin can manage that easily. Even if "the west" agrees to continue supporting Ukraine indefinitely at the current level, Ukraine can't "win". They are running out of troops and morale. They are also suffering grievous damage to infrastructure and thus the economy. The war might continue for awhile, maybe a year, but probably less. It depends a lot on how long Putin can keep up the pressure on all fronts. Eventually he will obtain a breakthrough that Ukraine can't plug and that even his ponderously slow army can exploit.

The West might have stopped the whole thing if they had gone all in for the Ukraine at the beginning. Dribbles and drabs, bids and pieces at a time simply was the wrong approach.

For sure the bits and pieces approach was always doomed to fail. If "the west" had gone "all in" early on, Ukraine had a chance to win simply because Russia was way overstretched and incompetent. Russia wasn't really ready for a real war. Neither was Ukraine. If the west could have got Ukraine ready to fight by fall of 2022 the offensives Ukraine did mount could have been decisive. They were somewhat "successful" as it was. The Kherson one had promise. Ukraine couldn't/didn't pull it off. More "help" from the west might have changed that. It would still have been a tall order, but it was a "once in a lifetime" chance. Given time, Russia could fortify, regroup, fix some of their organizational problems, and get "serious". That is what happened. As Napoleon said, "Ask anything of me but time".

Even if the west had gone "all in", that could have been the outcome. If the west was actually serious, it would have in parallel prepared Ukraine to win the war in 2023 or 2024. This would mean training pilots, having Ukraine update their conscription and training efforts, and giving Ukraine enough long-range firepower to disrupt the fortification of the southern part of occupied Ukraine. It couldn't be "stopped", but it could be made too expensive. Laying all those mines was done in the open.  The fortifications were installed under "civilian" conditions. That could  have been curtailed at least and Russia forced to fortify further back from the front lines as well as paying a high price to do it. Ukraine would have a path to victory.

If Ukraine had an air force and adequate mine breaching equipment in 2023 their counteroffensive could have succeeded, especially if the Russian fortifications were less well protected due to previous Ukrainian actions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ukrai...roffensive is a good reference. The important sentence is

Ukrainian forces did not reach the city of Tokmak, described as a "minimum goal" by Ukrainian general Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, and the probable initial objective of reaching the Sea of Azov to split the Russian forces in southern Ukraine remained unfulfilled.[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ukrainian_counteroffensive#cite_note-out_of_schedule-59][/url]

At that point Ukraine lost the initiative, and due to the failure of the west to resource them to develop an adequate military, they really had no way ahead. Even if the west had finally decided to do this in 2023, it might well have been too late. At this point, it is unclear how Ukraine can win without some direct involvement of NATO assets, such as a "flying tiger" type operation (at a minimum). That isn't politically possible in Europe or the US. So here we are. Ukraine can only hope the Tsar dies. Worked for Frederic the Great :-(.

[Goose]

At this point, no matter what the West does, I do not think Putin can agree to any sort of peace that doesn't give him a large part of Ukraine.  This little expedition has cost Russian brobdingnagian amounts of money, hundred's of thousands of casualties, loss of prestige, and billions of dollars in frozen assets around the world.  Politically, if he agrees to anything short of outright victory, it will have to give him a near victory with everyone assuming a few years down the road he will seize the rest of it.

Or the remaining Ukraine will "freely of its own will" join the Russian federation. Putin also has no reason to settle for less. Once "the west" has made it clear we don't intend to support continued Ukrainian resistance, it becomes a question of time. Probably not much time. Putin can manage that easily. Even if "the west" agrees to continue supporting Ukraine indefinitely at the current level, Ukraine can't "win". They are running out of troops and morale. They are also suffering grievous damage to infrastructure and thus the economy. The war might continue for awhile, maybe a year, but probably less. It depends a lot on how long Putin can keep up the pressure on all fronts. Eventually he will obtain a breakthrough that Ukraine can't plug and that even his ponderously slow army can exploit.

The West might have stopped the whole thing if they had gone all in for the Ukraine at the beginning. Dribbles and drabs, bids and pieces at a time simply was the wrong approach.

For sure the bits and pieces approach was always doomed to fail. If "the west" had gone "all in" early on, Ukraine had a chance to win simply because Russia was way overstretched and incompetent. Russia wasn't really ready for a real war. Neither was Ukraine. If the west could have got Ukraine ready to fight by fall of 2022 the offensives Ukraine did mount could have been decisive. They were somewhat "successful" as it was. The Kherson one had promise. Ukraine couldn't/didn't pull it off. More "help" from the west might have changed that. It would still have been a tall order, but it was a "once in a lifetime" chance. Given time, Russia could fortify, regroup, fix some of their organizational problems, and get "serious". That is what happened. As Napoleon said, "Ask anything of me but time".

Even if the west had gone "all in", that could have been the outcome. If the west was actually serious, it would have in parallel prepared Ukraine to win the war in 2023 or 2024. This would mean training pilots, having Ukraine update their conscription and training efforts, and giving Ukraine enough long-range firepower to disrupt the fortification of the southern part of occupied Ukraine. It couldn't be "stopped", but it could be made too expensive. Laying all those mines was done in the open.  The fortifications were installed under "civilian" conditions. That could  have been curtailed at least and Russia forced to fortify further back from the front lines as well as paying a high price to do it. Ukraine would have a path to victory.

If Ukraine had an air force and adequate mine breaching equipment in 2023 their counteroffensive could have succeeded, especially if the Russian fortifications were less well protected due to previous Ukrainian actions. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ukrai...roffensive is a good reference. The important sentence is

Ukrainian forces did not reach the city of Tokmak, described as a "minimum goal" by Ukrainian general Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, and the probable initial objective of reaching the Sea of Azov to split the Russian forces in southern Ukraine remained unfulfilled.[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Ukrainian_counteroffensive#cite_note-out_of_schedule-59][/url]

At that point Ukraine lost the initiative, and due to the failure of the west to resource them to develop an adequate military, they really had no way ahead. Even if the west had finally decided to do this in 2023, it might well have been too late. At this point, it is unclear how Ukraine can win without some direct involvement of NATO assets, such as a "flying tiger" type operation (at a minimum). That isn't politically possible in Europe or the US. So here we are. Ukraine can only hope the Tsar dies. Worked for Frederic the Great :-(.

[TrumpCard]

Assuming Putin is purely Machiavellian and doesn't care about the suffering of the Russian or Ukrainian people, is there a decision calculus that would say, in retrospect and with hindsight, Putin did the right thing by attacking?

[TrumpCard]

Assuming Putin is purely Machiavellian and doesn't care about the suffering of the Russian or Ukrainian people, is there a decision calculus that would say, in retrospect and with hindsight, Putin did the right thing by attacking?

[Goose]

Assuming Putin is purely Machiavellian and doesn't care about the suffering of the Russian or Ukrainian people, is there a decision calculus that would say, in retrospect and with hindsight, Putin did the right thing by attacking?

Hard to justify on any benefit/cost analysis. Putin has lost his oil and gas business in Europe. Improbable he gets it all back, and what he does get back will now be competitive. He will need to offer deep discounts. That alone probably makes the war a net loss. He will be ruling a destroyed Ukraine that will need massive investment to get it back even to where it was before the war. Russia can't afford to do so, especially after this war. Ukraine had a minuscule GDP before it was wrecked. It was much poorer than even Russia. Add to this the sanctions and the impounded funds Russia will never get back. Economically, now and going forward, it is a disaster for Russia.

Politically, it is harder to analyze. Putin wants to re-create the Russian empire, at least in the main. To do that, he needs Ukraine. Back in 2014 Russia still had a shot at converting Ukraine to a vassal state, like Belarus. After Russia seized Crimea, that became very improbable. Given that, invading Ukraine became almost a necessity to meet Putin's goals. So, it became a question of timing. It was obvious that Putin expected a 3 day war. He didn't get that. Had he chosen to strengthen and modernize his military before he attacked, he could have had his 3 day war. He perhaps could have had it if he had just "trained up" the forces he had. He didn't do that either. We can say for sure Putin's timing was definitely "bad". 

In the end, Putin may get absolute control of Ukraine. That was his goal. However, the "side effects" may destabilize his rule. If that happens, his attempt to re-create the Russian empire will have failed. We don't know yet. Therefore, we can't say yet if he achieved his political goal.

[Goose]

Assuming Putin is purely Machiavellian and doesn't care about the suffering of the Russian or Ukrainian people, is there a decision calculus that would say, in retrospect and with hindsight, Putin did the right thing by attacking?

Hard to justify on any benefit/cost analysis. Putin has lost his oil and gas business in Europe. Improbable he gets it all back, and what he does get back will now be competitive. He will need to offer deep discounts. That alone probably makes the war a net loss. He will be ruling a destroyed Ukraine that will need massive investment to get it back even to where it was before the war. Russia can't afford to do so, especially after this war. Ukraine had a minuscule GDP before it was wrecked. It was much poorer than even Russia. Add to this the sanctions and the impounded funds Russia will never get back. Economically, now and going forward, it is a disaster for Russia.

Politically, it is harder to analyze. Putin wants to re-create the Russian empire, at least in the main. To do that, he needs Ukraine. Back in 2014 Russia still had a shot at converting Ukraine to a vassal state, like Belarus. After Russia seized Crimea, that became very improbable. Given that, invading Ukraine became almost a necessity to meet Putin's goals. So, it became a question of timing. It was obvious that Putin expected a 3 day war. He didn't get that. Had he chosen to strengthen and modernize his military before he attacked, he could have had his 3 day war. He perhaps could have had it if he had just "trained up" the forces he had. He didn't do that either. We can say for sure Putin's timing was definitely "bad". 

In the end, Putin may get absolute control of Ukraine. That was his goal. However, the "side effects" may destabilize his rule. If that happens, his attempt to re-create the Russian empire will have failed. We don't know yet. Therefore, we can't say yet if he achieved his political goal.

[newguy]

i may have jumped the gun on this one......apparently it was an intermediate-range missile.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...y-dodgers/

[newguy]

i may have jumped the gun on this one......apparently it was an intermediate-range missile.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/20...y-dodgers/

[M T]

Just how dumb is Putin?  I don't just mean how much his ideas conflict with ours, but how poorly he protects his advantages.  

Ok, maybe a multi-year military exercise against Ukraine is reducing prison costs and welfare rolls, but his economy is in the tank.  That exercise showed many flaws in Russian military equipment, but he's going to get to replace so much of it.  It also showed how poor his military leadership was, but those problems have flown out the window.

Now, he's let the West watch Russia launch an IRBM.  The West gets to see if their intelligence systems detected the pre-launch signs of it, and whether all the West's sensors, alarms, and responses when such a launch happens.

[M T]

Just how dumb is Putin?  I don't just mean how much his ideas conflict with ours, but how poorly he protects his advantages.  

Ok, maybe a multi-year military exercise against Ukraine is reducing prison costs and welfare rolls, but his economy is in the tank.  That exercise showed many flaws in Russian military equipment, but he's going to get to replace so much of it.  It also showed how poor his military leadership was, but those problems have flown out the window.

Now, he's let the West watch Russia launch an IRBM.  The West gets to see if their intelligence systems detected the pre-launch signs of it, and whether all the West's sensors, alarms, and responses when such a launch happens.

[GK3]

Just how dumb is Putin?  I don't just mean how much his ideas conflict with ours, but how poorly he protects his advantages.  

Ok, maybe a multi-year military exercise against Ukraine is reducing prison costs and welfare rolls, but his economy is in the tank.  That exercise showed many flaws in Russian military equipment, but he's going to get to replace so much of it.  It also showed how poor his military leadership was, but those problems have flown out the window.

Now, he's let the West watch Russia launch an IRBM.  The West gets to see if their intelligence systems detected the pre-launch signs of it, and whether all the West's sensors, alarms, and responses when such a launch happens.

I don't think he is "dumb" but more like say Stalin or Hitler whose vison of the world drove them to try and create it without too much regard to whether it was possible.  At this point, Putin probably gets Ukraine, but what does he get? a destroyed country where anyone who can has already left.  I don't think Putin has enough financial resources to rebuild his own economy much less rebuild the Ukraine's  So now he is left with diminished markets for his hydrocarbons, much of his foreign bank assets seized etc. My guess is he won't survive his "victory" very long.

[GK3]

Just how dumb is Putin?  I don't just mean how much his ideas conflict with ours, but how poorly he protects his advantages.  

Ok, maybe a multi-year military exercise against Ukraine is reducing prison costs and welfare rolls, but his economy is in the tank.  That exercise showed many flaws in Russian military equipment, but he's going to get to replace so much of it.  It also showed how poor his military leadership was, but those problems have flown out the window.

Now, he's let the West watch Russia launch an IRBM.  The West gets to see if their intelligence systems detected the pre-launch signs of it, and whether all the West's sensors, alarms, and responses when such a launch happens.

I don't think he is "dumb" but more like say Stalin or Hitler whose vison of the world drove them to try and create it without too much regard to whether it was possible.  At this point, Putin probably gets Ukraine, but what does he get? a destroyed country where anyone who can has already left.  I don't think Putin has enough financial resources to rebuild his own economy much less rebuild the Ukraine's  So now he is left with diminished markets for his hydrocarbons, much of his foreign bank assets seized etc. My guess is he won't survive his "victory" very long.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/promised-air-...57918.html

This is important because it clearly illustrates the lack of urgency under which "the west" operates regarding Ukraine. Part of that two years was unavoidable. Building the NASAMS would take some time, although there were several already being built that could have been diverted to Ukraine if that had been chosen. The "mechanical" delays in just getting the money in place plus having to negotiate a contract are simply inexcusable if one expects to "win" a war. The number of references in post hoc analysis of many wars and battles clearly shows the effects of being "slow".  I can tell you that in a situation like this back in the 1970s a "letter contract" would have been placed to get this critical item built without waiting for all the ink to dry on the sequentially dotted is and crossed ts. Everybody knew that the money would arrive and that a contract would be negotiated. Doing it sequentially cost Ukrainian lives and helped nobody. Yet that is what was done and no "outrage" was detected that made any difference.

The idea that the US can suddenly stop doing such stupid things if "we were directly involved" is very questionable. Bureaucracies are creatures of habit. They have great difficulty changing quickly. Assuming they can be changed at all.

[Goose]

https://www.yahoo.com/news/promised-air-...57918.html

This is important because it clearly illustrates the lack of urgency under which "the west" operates regarding Ukraine. Part of that two years was unavoidable. Building the NASAMS would take some time, although there were several already being built that could have been diverted to Ukraine if that had been chosen. The "mechanical" delays in just getting the money in place plus having to negotiate a contract are simply inexcusable if one expects to "win" a war. The number of references in post hoc analysis of many wars and battles clearly shows the effects of being "slow".  I can tell you that in a situation like this back in the 1970s a "letter contract" would have been placed to get this critical item built without waiting for all the ink to dry on the sequentially dotted is and crossed ts. Everybody knew that the money would arrive and that a contract would be negotiated. Doing it sequentially cost Ukrainian lives and helped nobody. Yet that is what was done and no "outrage" was detected that made any difference.

The idea that the US can suddenly stop doing such stupid things if "we were directly involved" is very questionable. Bureaucracies are creatures of habit. They have great difficulty changing quickly. Assuming they can be changed at all.

[Goose]

I don't think he is "dumb" but more like say Stalin or Hitler whose vison of the world drove them to try and create it without too much regard to whether it was possible.  At this point, Putin probably gets Ukraine, but what does he get? a destroyed country where anyone who can has already left.  I don't think Putin has enough financial resources to rebuild his own economy much less rebuild the Ukraine's  So now he is left with diminished markets for his hydrocarbons, much of his foreign bank assets seized etc. My guess is he won't survive his "victory" very long.

These dictators very much did believe it was possible. In Stalin's case, despite all the mistakes he made, it was possible. His country survived and he got control of eastern Europe. Hitler repeatedly took chances that no "sane" leader would take. He did this because he thought he understood the psychology of his opponents and because he felt he was "destined" for success. His initial successes convinced him he was correct and would succeed. His country bought into it. He came closer than he had any right to expect given his initial starting point.

Putin expected a 3 day war with "quick" success. Most of the world expected the same. Obviously that wasn't an irrational expectation given how common it was. When that didn't happen, mostly due to Russian incompetence and somewhat due to fierce Ukrainian resistance, Putin undoubtedly found himself in the position of the German generals after the UK and France held firm on their declaration of war over Poland. The question became "What now?". Putin really had no other choice, and I suspect his generals assured him that it would still all be over "soon".

Obviously I agree that starting a war to capture Ukraine, even a 3 day one, was foolish. Best case Putin would have been faced with a guerilla war in a desperately poor country. It actually has turned out much, much worse than that for him, once again illustrating that nothing in war is "certain". One has to "make it happen", and if one can not or does not the results can be pretty bad :-).

I don't agree that Putin's days are numbered once Russia figures out what this war as cost them in money, prestige, and blood. Appeals to Russian patriotism go a long way. The "state" can declare victory and therefore it is a victory. Russians are also fatalistic, probably as a result of their history. Most important of all, the "If not Putin, who?" question remains unanswered. One only has to look at the example of Saddam Hussein or even Hitler himself. All of Germany knew the war was lost by 1945 at the latest. Most knew it earlier. Yet, they fought on and didn't really try to replace Hitler. For that matter consider Tsar Nicholas II after the debacle of the Russo-Japanese war. There was a revolt, but he and his monarchy survived it.

Some of these examples illustrate that dictators can endure serious defeats. Putin will claim "victory" and the fact it was a Pyrrhic one probably won't count against him much. If he loses the war, that MAY take him down, but even that is not "certain".

[Goose]

I don't think he is "dumb" but more like say Stalin or Hitler whose vison of the world drove them to try and create it without too much regard to whether it was possible.  At this point, Putin probably gets Ukraine, but what does he get? a destroyed country where anyone who can has already left.  I don't think Putin has enough financial resources to rebuild his own economy much less rebuild the Ukraine's  So now he is left with diminished markets for his hydrocarbons, much of his foreign bank assets seized etc. My guess is he won't survive his "victory" very long.

These dictators very much did believe it was possible. In Stalin's case, despite all the mistakes he made, it was possible. His country survived and he got control of eastern Europe. Hitler repeatedly took chances that no "sane" leader would take. He did this because he thought he understood the psychology of his opponents and because he felt he was "destined" for success. His initial successes convinced him he was correct and would succeed. His country bought into it. He came closer than he had any right to expect given his initial starting point.

Putin expected a 3 day war with "quick" success. Most of the world expected the same. Obviously that wasn't an irrational expectation given how common it was. When that didn't happen, mostly due to Russian incompetence and somewhat due to fierce Ukrainian resistance, Putin undoubtedly found himself in the position of the German generals after the UK and France held firm on their declaration of war over Poland. The question became "What now?". Putin really had no other choice, and I suspect his generals assured him that it would still all be over "soon".

Obviously I agree that starting a war to capture Ukraine, even a 3 day one, was foolish. Best case Putin would have been faced with a guerilla war in a desperately poor country. It actually has turned out much, much worse than that for him, once again illustrating that nothing in war is "certain". One has to "make it happen", and if one can not or does not the results can be pretty bad :-).

I don't agree that Putin's days are numbered once Russia figures out what this war as cost them in money, prestige, and blood. Appeals to Russian patriotism go a long way. The "state" can declare victory and therefore it is a victory. Russians are also fatalistic, probably as a result of their history. Most important of all, the "If not Putin, who?" question remains unanswered. One only has to look at the example of Saddam Hussein or even Hitler himself. All of Germany knew the war was lost by 1945 at the latest. Most knew it earlier. Yet, they fought on and didn't really try to replace Hitler. For that matter consider Tsar Nicholas II after the debacle of the Russo-Japanese war. There was a revolt, but he and his monarchy survived it.

Some of these examples illustrate that dictators can endure serious defeats. Putin will claim "victory" and the fact it was a Pyrrhic one probably won't count against him much. If he loses the war, that MAY take him down, but even that is not "certain".