[BostonCard]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

It’s behind a paywall, but I wanted to draw attention to the headline, which most definitely was not on my bingo card a couple months ago: “Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On”

BC

[BostonCard]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

It’s behind a paywall, but I wanted to draw attention to the headline, which most definitely was not on my bingo card a couple months ago: “Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On”

BC

[82lsju]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

It’s behind a paywall, but I wanted to draw attention to the headline, which most definitely was not on my bingo card a couple months ago: “Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On”

BC

I can read it when I disable my adblocker

[82lsju]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

It’s behind a paywall, but I wanted to draw attention to the headline, which most definitely was not on my bingo card a couple months ago: “Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On”

BC

I can read it when I disable my adblocker

[BostonCard]

I think you get two or three free articles a month.  I’m past my quota.

BC

[BostonCard]

I think you get two or three free articles a month.  I’m past my quota.

BC

[fullmetal]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

https://pastebin.com/1sgXkzXU

[fullmetal]

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/tru...2xinterest

https://pastebin.com/1sgXkzXU

[BostonCard]

I’m missing updates from Goose et al.

I found this account of the current situation based on an October trip to the front lines.

https://rochan-consulting.com/impression...id=2122081

Tough going out there.

BC

[BostonCard]

I’m missing updates from Goose et al.

I found this account of the current situation based on an October trip to the front lines.

https://rochan-consulting.com/impression...id=2122081

Tough going out there.

BC

[Goose]

 1) 19 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Sumy_offensive
 2) 28 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump...ce_meeting
 3)  4 March https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-...h%20Russia.
 4)  6 March https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russi...1fe89bba0f
 5) 14 March https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...gotiations
 6) 20 May   https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...-offensive
 7) 2 Sept   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...n-victory/
 8) 17 Sept  https://kyivindependent.com/russia-prepa...nsky-says/

 9) 17 Sept  https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...34906.html

10)  7 Oct   https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa...on/684419/

11)  9 Oct   https://www.twz.com/news-features/inside...-in-a-year

12) 10 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...26456.html

13) 11 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...27265.html
 

Many of you may remember that I predicted that Ukraine wouldn't last past June of this year. Obviously that was not what happened, which all of you have been kind enough not to remind me :-). However, I think it is worth examining why the outcome was different and to look at what might come "next".

 

My original analysis was based on the expectation that the administration would fully throw Ukraine under the bus. I expected that the US would cease all arms deliveries to Ukraine. Doing so seemed almost a certainty when SecDef ordered (on essentially day 1 of his tenure) that all military aid flowing to Ukraine based on previous appropriations cease immediately. While this was immediately reversed by "higher authority" SecDef's preferences were quite clear. I expected that the US would cut off all intelligence support. I further expected that the president would remove all sanctions from Russia. That is what the president had campaigned upon. He was going to end the war quickly, and this would certainly go a long way to make that happen. Had the president actually done this it would have made most of the previous and subsequent EU sanctions moot. The US would presumably provide Russia's needs that the EU/UK would prohibit. It looked probable at the time that the "worst case" scenario was unfolding (Ref-2, Ref-3, Ref-4).

 

My analysis also took into account that in 2024 Putin had directed the substantial expansion of the Russian army. By January 2025 it was apparent Putin had largely succeeded in greatly increasing the available troop strength that could be deployed in Ukraine. While the quality of the troops may have been questionable, there was no reason to believe they would be any worse than what Russia was previously using. I therefore expected major Russian offensives on several fronts. I expected these offensives to begin just after the mud season ended, probably late February/early March. From Ref-9

Zelensky said Russia prepared operations this year along four axes: Sumy, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhya.

It did initially appear that was the "plan", as an offensive along the Sumy axis did take place in mid-February (Ref-1, Ref-5). Soviet doctrine always called for multiple axis of advance. Sometimes one offensive would start a week or two earlier than the others. This was done to give the opponent the opportunity to make a mistake by weakening the defenses against the pending operations in order to defeat the initial earlier offensive.

 

In all cases the "additional" offensives were additionally (sometimes primarily) intended to deny the enemy the ability to shift reserves from one area to another. This aspect is especially important with respect to Ukraine. The vast majority of the Ukrainian military is infantry. Almost none of that infantry has organic transport. Ukraine also lacks a large "transportation corps" that can be used to move these infantry organization quickly and easily. On top of that, much of the Ukrainian infantry are "national guard" type volunteers that joined the military/organized themselves to defend their local area. These troops would understandably resist orders to move a long way from home even if it were possible to move them. Ukraine has addressed the need for a "mobile reserve" by developing several "elite" formations that are as close as Ukraine has to mechanized infantry. They also have smaller groups that are Special Operations Capable. Both forces are capable but available in extremely limited numbers. Thus, once these elite units were committed Ukraine would have no reserves.

 

For whatever reasons the administration did not completely throw Ukraine under the bus. We can conjecture as to why, and that would perhaps be interesting. Push-back from the UK, EU, and some GOP US Senators probably played a role. When Putin did not accede to a cease fire after Zelenskyy did it probably destroyed the administration's "quick end" plans. In any case, the administration at least stayed the execution.

 

Even more inexplicably the other three identified Russian offensives didn't go in. Putin had all the troops he needed already in place. Yet we did not see three more offensives of more than 100k troops suddenly attacking with new energy and determination. This makes no sense. Russia now has 700K troops involved in the Ukraine area. If nothing else, that costs a LOT of money. IMO the TL;DR is that Putin believed it highly likely the administration would hand him Ukraine on a plate. It is still probable Putin believes that will happen. It was always unlikely that several of the four possible offensives would result in breakthroughs. It would be certain that stepped-up "meat" attacks would result in very high casualties. While Putin has never shown an aversion to casualties he undoubtedly didn't want to run up a massive butcher's bill unnecessarily. If the administration was going to grant his wish fairly soon it would be hard to explain the deaths. In addition, nothing in war is certain and the offensives could have totally failed. Avoiding that risk was a definite consideration. Besides, the troops were there and could be used at any later time Putin chose.

 

[Goose]

 1) 19 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Sumy_offensive
 2) 28 Feb   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Trump...ce_meeting
 3)  4 March https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-...h%20Russia.
 4)  6 March https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-russi...1fe89bba0f
 5) 14 March https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/m...gotiations
 6) 20 May   https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-researc...-offensive
 7) 2 Sept   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/uk...n-victory/
 8) 17 Sept  https://kyivindependent.com/russia-prepa...nsky-says/

 9) 17 Sept  https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/zele...34906.html

10)  7 Oct   https://www.theatlantic.com/internationa...on/684419/

11)  9 Oct   https://www.twz.com/news-features/inside...-in-a-year

12) 10 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...26456.html

13) 11 Nov   https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/ukra...27265.html
 

Many of you may remember that I predicted that Ukraine wouldn't last past June of this year. Obviously that was not what happened, which all of you have been kind enough not to remind me :-). However, I think it is worth examining why the outcome was different and to look at what might come "next".

 

My original analysis was based on the expectation that the administration would fully throw Ukraine under the bus. I expected that the US would cease all arms deliveries to Ukraine. Doing so seemed almost a certainty when SecDef ordered (on essentially day 1 of his tenure) that all military aid flowing to Ukraine based on previous appropriations cease immediately. While this was immediately reversed by "higher authority" SecDef's preferences were quite clear. I expected that the US would cut off all intelligence support. I further expected that the president would remove all sanctions from Russia. That is what the president had campaigned upon. He was going to end the war quickly, and this would certainly go a long way to make that happen. Had the president actually done this it would have made most of the previous and subsequent EU sanctions moot. The US would presumably provide Russia's needs that the EU/UK would prohibit. It looked probable at the time that the "worst case" scenario was unfolding (Ref-2, Ref-3, Ref-4).

 

My analysis also took into account that in 2024 Putin had directed the substantial expansion of the Russian army. By January 2025 it was apparent Putin had largely succeeded in greatly increasing the available troop strength that could be deployed in Ukraine. While the quality of the troops may have been questionable, there was no reason to believe they would be any worse than what Russia was previously using. I therefore expected major Russian offensives on several fronts. I expected these offensives to begin just after the mud season ended, probably late February/early March. From Ref-9

Zelensky said Russia prepared operations this year along four axes: Sumy, Novopavlivka, Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhya.

It did initially appear that was the "plan", as an offensive along the Sumy axis did take place in mid-February (Ref-1, Ref-5). Soviet doctrine always called for multiple axis of advance. Sometimes one offensive would start a week or two earlier than the others. This was done to give the opponent the opportunity to make a mistake by weakening the defenses against the pending operations in order to defeat the initial earlier offensive.

 

In all cases the "additional" offensives were additionally (sometimes primarily) intended to deny the enemy the ability to shift reserves from one area to another. This aspect is especially important with respect to Ukraine. The vast majority of the Ukrainian military is infantry. Almost none of that infantry has organic transport. Ukraine also lacks a large "transportation corps" that can be used to move these infantry organization quickly and easily. On top of that, much of the Ukrainian infantry are "national guard" type volunteers that joined the military/organized themselves to defend their local area. These troops would understandably resist orders to move a long way from home even if it were possible to move them. Ukraine has addressed the need for a "mobile reserve" by developing several "elite" formations that are as close as Ukraine has to mechanized infantry. They also have smaller groups that are Special Operations Capable. Both forces are capable but available in extremely limited numbers. Thus, once these elite units were committed Ukraine would have no reserves.

 

For whatever reasons the administration did not completely throw Ukraine under the bus. We can conjecture as to why, and that would perhaps be interesting. Push-back from the UK, EU, and some GOP US Senators probably played a role. When Putin did not accede to a cease fire after Zelenskyy did it probably destroyed the administration's "quick end" plans. In any case, the administration at least stayed the execution.

 

Even more inexplicably the other three identified Russian offensives didn't go in. Putin had all the troops he needed already in place. Yet we did not see three more offensives of more than 100k troops suddenly attacking with new energy and determination. This makes no sense. Russia now has 700K troops involved in the Ukraine area. If nothing else, that costs a LOT of money. IMO the TL;DR is that Putin believed it highly likely the administration would hand him Ukraine on a plate. It is still probable Putin believes that will happen. It was always unlikely that several of the four possible offensives would result in breakthroughs. It would be certain that stepped-up "meat" attacks would result in very high casualties. While Putin has never shown an aversion to casualties he undoubtedly didn't want to run up a massive butcher's bill unnecessarily. If the administration was going to grant his wish fairly soon it would be hard to explain the deaths. In addition, nothing in war is certain and the offensives could have totally failed. Avoiding that risk was a definite consideration. Besides, the troops were there and could be used at any later time Putin chose.

 

[Goose]

Since the other Russian offensives didn't happen, Ukraine was able to utilize the 67th Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Special Purpose Regiment   to bring the offensive along the Sumy axis to a halt. That would probably not have been possible if Russia had executed their original plan. In September Ukraine committed the 12th National Guard Brigade Azov (Azov Corps) and both the 79th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades to the battle north of Pokrovsk. It is very improbable that this strategic reserve would have been available if Putin had pulled the trigger back in March/early April. Many people (including me) were increasingly asking "What is Putin waiting for?". Ref-6 addressed the issue directly. It predicted that there would be a "soft start" to the offensive but that it would build up. Basically, that didn't happen. This article did address several of the same issues discussed above. I do believe it was updated after its original May of 2025 publication date. In any event, it fills the event "hole" from the non-existent Russian summer offensive to the present, more or less. Fast-forwarding to Ref-7 (2 Sept) we have the following

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

 

As previously stated, my position is that the offensive didn't "fail". It didn't happen. However, the current "state of play" is in any case showing signs that Putin was correct about the Ukrainian army being vulnerable.

 

Ukraine simply doesn't (and never did) have enough troops to defend its frontier from Russia. We here in the "west" have trouble comprehending the sheer size of Ukraine, let alone Russia. While many web articles go to great lengths to (correctly) point out that the feasible lines of advance into Ukraine are limited, the number is very large. This situation makes fighting in Ukraine and Russia quite unique. The battles in Donbas occur along restricted GLOCs. In very few cases (all in the south) has Ukraine attempted to defend in anything other than "built up" areas. Even the fighting in open fields involves defending one treeline and falling back to the next if flanked. In the open steppe, of which Ukraine and Russia both have in abundance, infantry simply cannot defend a line of contact. Artillery will get them if nothing else does.

 

I could go on and on about the history of combat in the Russian steppe areas, and in a future post, I might. Suffice it to say that Russia (and Ukraine as formerly part of Russia) are a black hole for troops. Many go in, none come out. No matter how many troops an attacker has, it is never enough. Germany attempted with some success to overcome this limitation by using very mobile forces. Offensively, this worked. However, once an area was secured forces were required to prevent the Russians from infiltrating back in. Germany simply didn't have enough PZ and PZG divisions to secure the vast eastern front. They had to "make do" with inadequate infantry forces (many of which were not German) that were not very mobile.

 

Eventually, Soviet mobile forces did to the Germans and their allies what Germany originally did to the Russians. Obviously, if you intend to fight in Russia (or Ukraine) you must have competent mobile forces. Nobody in their right mind would even dream of fighting in Ukraine without that, and even with that it is quite possible to get thinned out by the size of the battle area to the point you can't complete the task. Yet Ukraine and Russia are beating their heads against each other with primarily "leg" infantry to advance a few km a month. Crazy.

 

The employment of FPV drones, initially by Ukraine and subsequently by Russia has made this infantry battle even deadlier than it was in the past. Infantry by itself has a relatively limited "kill zone". An AK-47 hs a maximum range of 800 meters, and an effective range of 300-400 meters. The US NGSW machine gun has a maximum range of 1200 meters and an effective range of 800 meters. Traditional infantry on infantry attacks where the defending side has significant cover (natural, field fortifications or an urban area) relies on the attacker bringing a significantly larger force to the battle unobserved. If the defender detects the attacker's movement to contact they can request artillery or air support to break up the attack before it goes in. Even if no such support is forthcoming the defender can optimally position himself to receive the attack. A person standing on unobstructed level ground can notionally see another such person at a range of about 8.5 km. Obviously topographic features and obstructions (e.g. foliage) can greatly lessen that distance. The attacker will do everything possible to utilize such cover to get as close to the objective as possible without being detected.

 

The FPV drones in Ukraine increased the detection range to 20 km or so. Ukraine was reliably able to detect enemy infantry concentrating for and advancing to contact. These attacks were very often broken up by artillery before they even started. The FPV drones also made using terrain and obstructions to mask troop movements almost impossible. The Russian massed "meat attacks" became too costly to contemplate. Russia responded by reducing the battlefield density. They seldom attacked in company or platoon strength. They would send out fire teams and hopefully several of them would get through undetected. If they did, they would attack in numbers that were far too small to break into the Ukrainian defenses but large enough to still cause casualties. This paradyme was expanded by supplying these fire team members with motorcycles and golf-cart type vehicles. The hope was these vehicles would allow some of the fire team to survive long enough to actually reach the Ukrainian defenses. The Russians would then try to reinforce these troops using similar low-density troop movements.

[Goose]

Since the other Russian offensives didn't happen, Ukraine was able to utilize the 67th Mechanized Brigade and the 4th Special Purpose Regiment   to bring the offensive along the Sumy axis to a halt. That would probably not have been possible if Russia had executed their original plan. In September Ukraine committed the 12th National Guard Brigade Azov (Azov Corps) and both the 79th and 82nd Air Assault Brigades to the battle north of Pokrovsk. It is very improbable that this strategic reserve would have been available if Putin had pulled the trigger back in March/early April. Many people (including me) were increasingly asking "What is Putin waiting for?". Ref-6 addressed the issue directly. It predicted that there would be a "soft start" to the offensive but that it would build up. Basically, that didn't happen. This article did address several of the same issues discussed above. I do believe it was updated after its original May of 2025 publication date. In any event, it fills the event "hole" from the non-existent Russian summer offensive to the present, more or less. Fast-forwarding to Ref-7 (2 Sept) we have the following

As August gives way to September, it is now abundantly clear that Putin’s big summer offensive has failed. The Russian army has been unable to secure any front line breakthroughs or capture a single major city, with overall Russian advances during the three summer months limited to an estimated 0.3 percent of Ukrainian territory. Crucially, key strategic objectives like Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine remain in Ukrainian hands.

 

As previously stated, my position is that the offensive didn't "fail". It didn't happen. However, the current "state of play" is in any case showing signs that Putin was correct about the Ukrainian army being vulnerable.

 

Ukraine simply doesn't (and never did) have enough troops to defend its frontier from Russia. We here in the "west" have trouble comprehending the sheer size of Ukraine, let alone Russia. While many web articles go to great lengths to (correctly) point out that the feasible lines of advance into Ukraine are limited, the number is very large. This situation makes fighting in Ukraine and Russia quite unique. The battles in Donbas occur along restricted GLOCs. In very few cases (all in the south) has Ukraine attempted to defend in anything other than "built up" areas. Even the fighting in open fields involves defending one treeline and falling back to the next if flanked. In the open steppe, of which Ukraine and Russia both have in abundance, infantry simply cannot defend a line of contact. Artillery will get them if nothing else does.

 

I could go on and on about the history of combat in the Russian steppe areas, and in a future post, I might. Suffice it to say that Russia (and Ukraine as formerly part of Russia) are a black hole for troops. Many go in, none come out. No matter how many troops an attacker has, it is never enough. Germany attempted with some success to overcome this limitation by using very mobile forces. Offensively, this worked. However, once an area was secured forces were required to prevent the Russians from infiltrating back in. Germany simply didn't have enough PZ and PZG divisions to secure the vast eastern front. They had to "make do" with inadequate infantry forces (many of which were not German) that were not very mobile.

 

Eventually, Soviet mobile forces did to the Germans and their allies what Germany originally did to the Russians. Obviously, if you intend to fight in Russia (or Ukraine) you must have competent mobile forces. Nobody in their right mind would even dream of fighting in Ukraine without that, and even with that it is quite possible to get thinned out by the size of the battle area to the point you can't complete the task. Yet Ukraine and Russia are beating their heads against each other with primarily "leg" infantry to advance a few km a month. Crazy.

 

The employment of FPV drones, initially by Ukraine and subsequently by Russia has made this infantry battle even deadlier than it was in the past. Infantry by itself has a relatively limited "kill zone". An AK-47 hs a maximum range of 800 meters, and an effective range of 300-400 meters. The US NGSW machine gun has a maximum range of 1200 meters and an effective range of 800 meters. Traditional infantry on infantry attacks where the defending side has significant cover (natural, field fortifications or an urban area) relies on the attacker bringing a significantly larger force to the battle unobserved. If the defender detects the attacker's movement to contact they can request artillery or air support to break up the attack before it goes in. Even if no such support is forthcoming the defender can optimally position himself to receive the attack. A person standing on unobstructed level ground can notionally see another such person at a range of about 8.5 km. Obviously topographic features and obstructions (e.g. foliage) can greatly lessen that distance. The attacker will do everything possible to utilize such cover to get as close to the objective as possible without being detected.

 

The FPV drones in Ukraine increased the detection range to 20 km or so. Ukraine was reliably able to detect enemy infantry concentrating for and advancing to contact. These attacks were very often broken up by artillery before they even started. The FPV drones also made using terrain and obstructions to mask troop movements almost impossible. The Russian massed "meat attacks" became too costly to contemplate. Russia responded by reducing the battlefield density. They seldom attacked in company or platoon strength. They would send out fire teams and hopefully several of them would get through undetected. If they did, they would attack in numbers that were far too small to break into the Ukrainian defenses but large enough to still cause casualties. This paradyme was expanded by supplying these fire team members with motorcycles and golf-cart type vehicles. The hope was these vehicles would allow some of the fire team to survive long enough to actually reach the Ukrainian defenses. The Russians would then try to reinforce these troops using similar low-density troop movements.

[Goose]

Russia also attempted to infiltrate troops through the inevitable weak spots in the Ukrainian defense. There are areas in Ukraine that have less than 10 Ukrainian troops per km. Even in more densely defended areas there are "seams" that can be exploited. Drones are essential in Ukraine's plans to "cover" all these weak spots. The drones can see the infiltrators coming and Ukraine can dispatch troops to "fill the hole" and meet them (if Ukraine has troops to send that are close enough to perform the task).

 

The Russian strategy and continuing attacks put lots of stress on the Ukrainian infantry personnel. While the Russians had disproportionately larger casualties, they could afford the losses. However, Ukraine felt they were doing pretty well. Ref-8 (17 Sept) discusses Ukraine's successes against the "summer offensive" while claiming Russia was preparing two more major offensives. However Ref-9 (also 17 Sept) asserted Russia was "too weak" to begin a major offensive. That assertion was not buttressed by any details however.

 

Slightly over a month later, the situation looked quite different. Putin might have been wise to not begin a major summer offensive because the continued single fixed Schwerpunkt was starting to have major effects. While Ref-10 expresses optimism regarding Ukraine's position, it also says

Ukraine is fighting a war of attrition. Any hopes that might have been raised by President Trump’s red-carpet diplomacy with Vladimir Putin have expired, and it is impossible to spend more than a few minutes near the front line without being confronted by Ukraine’s greatest vulnerability: lack of soldiers.

All of the officers I met with, during a week in northeastern Ukraine, told me that the key to keeping the Russians at bay lies in finding better ways to compensate for Ukraine’s desperate shortage of manpower.

Indeed this is seriously bad news given that this offensive is the only "serious" Russian offensive and not a "full-blooded" one at that. Even more seriously:

“Our main purpose is to not let direct contact happen, so Ukrainian troops don’t have to engage,” one local commander told me.

The obvious problem with that approach is that Russia is going to continue to put pressure on Ukraine in at least Donbas, if not elsewhere. If Ukraine is unable/unwilling to fight an infantry battle its only alternative is a Fabian strategy. That is possible only if 1) Your troops are mobile enough not to get "fixed" in a position, 2) You can afford to give up the objectives the enemy is attempting to capture, and 3) You are politically supported in doing so. Definitely 2 and 3 are not on offer in Donbas, and 1 is questionable as well. Ref-11 (11 Oct) is generally upbeat, but does contain some really "interesting" information:

Q: Any other major changes in battlefield tactics by either side?
A: Look, soon there will be no leaves on the trees. They would all have fallen and without leaves, it’s almost impossible to use these small groups of enemies on foot because we will simply see them. But the enemy keeps learning. Every time the enemy uses new tactics.
Q:  Talk about Russian armor. How are the Russians massing it?
A: We don’t see that the enemy is using tanks really often. Instead, they are using armored vehicles and small groups of assault troops who go just by foot or motorcycle. The enemy uses tanks and armored vehicles in order to make a hole in Ukrainian defense lines. After they make this hole, they throw infantry on regular vehicles or motorcycles. So their tactic is that first they advance with a tank and this is a special tank. It has radio electronic warfare and some special anti-mine equipment.

After the tank, they have armored vehicles for infantrymen. Usually, before the tank, they can send several motorcycles to clear the road of mines. We call this a tank fist. So when this tank fist makes a hole in the Ukrainian defenses, Russian infantry use either motorcycles or light vehicles like buggies. Nowadays, this is the enemy’s most common assault tactic. But we should say the enemy uses the meat grinder still. Every single day, the Russian army loses hundreds of people by sending them either on foot or on motorcycles. This is the meat grinder.

The infiltration tactics are more difficult when the leaves are off the trees. Yet we know these tactics are being quite damaging to Ukraine. Sounds like wishful thinking. We also see Russia mounting attacks with mechanized infantry in APCs again. While not "conventional", their approach apparently is working to some degree.

 

A month later Ref-12 (10 Nov) effectively admits that Ukraine no longer can remain in Pokrovsk. It can no longer be supplied. While officially the battle isn't over, in reality it is. I previously posted about the state of play on this date (Post) and will not repeat it here. Ref-13 (11 Nov) details a Ukrainian withdrawal on another front. While bad for morale, it was probably necessary. Unfortunately the current trend indicates the personnel shortage is really being felt.

 

As we know, infiltrators had a big role in the recent setbacks in Donbas. However, the biggest takeaway IMO is that the fact FPV drones lack an all-weather capability is a very critical disadvantage. Russia took great advantage of the onset of bad weather to move troops to contact while Ukraine couldn't see them. Once the Russian troops get into the village/urban area Ukraine is defending drones lose a lot of their advantages. Buildings obscure nearby areas. The drone actually has to go to the next block. It can't see nearly as far as it can in open ground. There is lots more bad weather ahead in Ukraine. The next three months may see a big increase in Russian operations, not the usual winter shutdown. They already have the troops. They don't need to wait for this year's class to get trained. Ukraine also lacks adequate numbers of infrared/low-light capable drones to operate on cloudy/moonless nights. The Bear has learned.

 

Right now Ukraine is suffering from a triple whammy. In increasing order of severity 1) setbacks on the battlefield forcing retreats, some of them significant, 2) increasing missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure aimed at freezing civilians this winter, and 3) the US administration negotiating a peace deal that is almost certainly not acceptable to Ukraine. The battlefield setbacks may have increased the probability that the US administration may throw Ukraine under the bus after all, making Putin's strategy look even better. Lots of the "information" in the press is speculative, so we don't know if such a peace deal actually exists, if the administration actually intends to agree to it, and what Ukraine may do in response.

 

Ukraine has inflicted significant damage on Russian POL structure. In addition the US/EU secondary sanctions has had a big effect on Russian POL deliveries across the board. The effects in India and China are significant. These sanctions probably were only possible because the price of oil is low and the supply is high. Not too many nations are harmed by not buying Russian oil under current circumstances.

 

The administration's tariffs on India were ineffective. The reason was that the tariffs exempted pharmaceuticals and electronics. These are two of the main Indian exports to the US by value. The other big one is gems, precious metals, and jewelry. The prices for these goods have skyrocketed, so India can sell domestically what the US would "normally" have taken at a very good price. Thus, all the administration's tariffs accomplished was to anger Modi.

---

The question now is will Ukraine be able to keep fighting long enough for these actions to economically force Russia out of the war, and even if they can, will the administration let them? Make no mistake. If the administration removes all US sanctions on Russia and stops helping Ukraine's war effort, particularly with respect to intelligence support, it is very improbable Ukraine can long continue, let alone prevail.

[Goose]

Russia also attempted to infiltrate troops through the inevitable weak spots in the Ukrainian defense. There are areas in Ukraine that have less than 10 Ukrainian troops per km. Even in more densely defended areas there are "seams" that can be exploited. Drones are essential in Ukraine's plans to "cover" all these weak spots. The drones can see the infiltrators coming and Ukraine can dispatch troops to "fill the hole" and meet them (if Ukraine has troops to send that are close enough to perform the task).

 

The Russian strategy and continuing attacks put lots of stress on the Ukrainian infantry personnel. While the Russians had disproportionately larger casualties, they could afford the losses. However, Ukraine felt they were doing pretty well. Ref-8 (17 Sept) discusses Ukraine's successes against the "summer offensive" while claiming Russia was preparing two more major offensives. However Ref-9 (also 17 Sept) asserted Russia was "too weak" to begin a major offensive. That assertion was not buttressed by any details however.

 

Slightly over a month later, the situation looked quite different. Putin might have been wise to not begin a major summer offensive because the continued single fixed Schwerpunkt was starting to have major effects. While Ref-10 expresses optimism regarding Ukraine's position, it also says

Ukraine is fighting a war of attrition. Any hopes that might have been raised by President Trump’s red-carpet diplomacy with Vladimir Putin have expired, and it is impossible to spend more than a few minutes near the front line without being confronted by Ukraine’s greatest vulnerability: lack of soldiers.

All of the officers I met with, during a week in northeastern Ukraine, told me that the key to keeping the Russians at bay lies in finding better ways to compensate for Ukraine’s desperate shortage of manpower.

Indeed this is seriously bad news given that this offensive is the only "serious" Russian offensive and not a "full-blooded" one at that. Even more seriously:

“Our main purpose is to not let direct contact happen, so Ukrainian troops don’t have to engage,” one local commander told me.

The obvious problem with that approach is that Russia is going to continue to put pressure on Ukraine in at least Donbas, if not elsewhere. If Ukraine is unable/unwilling to fight an infantry battle its only alternative is a Fabian strategy. That is possible only if 1) Your troops are mobile enough not to get "fixed" in a position, 2) You can afford to give up the objectives the enemy is attempting to capture, and 3) You are politically supported in doing so. Definitely 2 and 3 are not on offer in Donbas, and 1 is questionable as well. Ref-11 (11 Oct) is generally upbeat, but does contain some really "interesting" information:

Q: Any other major changes in battlefield tactics by either side?
A: Look, soon there will be no leaves on the trees. They would all have fallen and without leaves, it’s almost impossible to use these small groups of enemies on foot because we will simply see them. But the enemy keeps learning. Every time the enemy uses new tactics.
Q:  Talk about Russian armor. How are the Russians massing it?
A: We don’t see that the enemy is using tanks really often. Instead, they are using armored vehicles and small groups of assault troops who go just by foot or motorcycle. The enemy uses tanks and armored vehicles in order to make a hole in Ukrainian defense lines. After they make this hole, they throw infantry on regular vehicles or motorcycles. So their tactic is that first they advance with a tank and this is a special tank. It has radio electronic warfare and some special anti-mine equipment.

After the tank, they have armored vehicles for infantrymen. Usually, before the tank, they can send several motorcycles to clear the road of mines. We call this a tank fist. So when this tank fist makes a hole in the Ukrainian defenses, Russian infantry use either motorcycles or light vehicles like buggies. Nowadays, this is the enemy’s most common assault tactic. But we should say the enemy uses the meat grinder still. Every single day, the Russian army loses hundreds of people by sending them either on foot or on motorcycles. This is the meat grinder.

The infiltration tactics are more difficult when the leaves are off the trees. Yet we know these tactics are being quite damaging to Ukraine. Sounds like wishful thinking. We also see Russia mounting attacks with mechanized infantry in APCs again. While not "conventional", their approach apparently is working to some degree.

 

A month later Ref-12 (10 Nov) effectively admits that Ukraine no longer can remain in Pokrovsk. It can no longer be supplied. While officially the battle isn't over, in reality it is. I previously posted about the state of play on this date (Post) and will not repeat it here. Ref-13 (11 Nov) details a Ukrainian withdrawal on another front. While bad for morale, it was probably necessary. Unfortunately the current trend indicates the personnel shortage is really being felt.

 

As we know, infiltrators had a big role in the recent setbacks in Donbas. However, the biggest takeaway IMO is that the fact FPV drones lack an all-weather capability is a very critical disadvantage. Russia took great advantage of the onset of bad weather to move troops to contact while Ukraine couldn't see them. Once the Russian troops get into the village/urban area Ukraine is defending drones lose a lot of their advantages. Buildings obscure nearby areas. The drone actually has to go to the next block. It can't see nearly as far as it can in open ground. There is lots more bad weather ahead in Ukraine. The next three months may see a big increase in Russian operations, not the usual winter shutdown. They already have the troops. They don't need to wait for this year's class to get trained. Ukraine also lacks adequate numbers of infrared/low-light capable drones to operate on cloudy/moonless nights. The Bear has learned.

 

Right now Ukraine is suffering from a triple whammy. In increasing order of severity 1) setbacks on the battlefield forcing retreats, some of them significant, 2) increasing missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure aimed at freezing civilians this winter, and 3) the US administration negotiating a peace deal that is almost certainly not acceptable to Ukraine. The battlefield setbacks may have increased the probability that the US administration may throw Ukraine under the bus after all, making Putin's strategy look even better. Lots of the "information" in the press is speculative, so we don't know if such a peace deal actually exists, if the administration actually intends to agree to it, and what Ukraine may do in response.

 

Ukraine has inflicted significant damage on Russian POL structure. In addition the US/EU secondary sanctions has had a big effect on Russian POL deliveries across the board. The effects in India and China are significant. These sanctions probably were only possible because the price of oil is low and the supply is high. Not too many nations are harmed by not buying Russian oil under current circumstances.

 

The administration's tariffs on India were ineffective. The reason was that the tariffs exempted pharmaceuticals and electronics. These are two of the main Indian exports to the US by value. The other big one is gems, precious metals, and jewelry. The prices for these goods have skyrocketed, so India can sell domestically what the US would "normally" have taken at a very good price. Thus, all the administration's tariffs accomplished was to anger Modi.

---

The question now is will Ukraine be able to keep fighting long enough for these actions to economically force Russia out of the war, and even if they can, will the administration let them? Make no mistake. If the administration removes all US sanctions on Russia and stops helping Ukraine's war effort, particularly with respect to intelligence support, it is very improbable Ukraine can long continue, let alone prevail.

[Goose]

I’m missing updates from Goose et al.

I have a couple of excuses. I got my right knee replaced on Aug. 5. Everything went very well, but going to the gym every day does eat up a bit of time :-). I also have a contract that is actually requiring me to do real work. That does get in the way quite a bit as well. I have a bunch of half-done things I am trying to finish so I can post them.

I found this account of the current situation based on an October trip to the front lines.

https://rochan-consulting.com/impression...id=2122081

Tough going out there.

BC

Indeed it is tough going. IMO it is all too easy to look at this war as a game of some kind, where we are rooting for Ukraine. It is no game, especially for those actively participating.
 
It is also very disheartening to see corruption scandals in Ukraine when the nation is fighting for its life. Zelenskyy doesn't deserve this. It takes a special kind of person to betray the trust of his fellow citizens under those conditions. It is even worse to undermine the legitimacy of a government that is dealing with an existential war while receiving wavering international support and unwillingness on the part of younger people to fight. Indeed, this war is being fought on Ukraine's side by people that wouldn't normally be accepted for combat duty in the US Army.

[Goose]

I’m missing updates from Goose et al.

I have a couple of excuses. I got my right knee replaced on Aug. 5. Everything went very well, but going to the gym every day does eat up a bit of time :-). I also have a contract that is actually requiring me to do real work. That does get in the way quite a bit as well. I have a bunch of half-done things I am trying to finish so I can post them.

I found this account of the current situation based on an October trip to the front lines.

https://rochan-consulting.com/impression...id=2122081

Tough going out there.

BC

Indeed it is tough going. IMO it is all too easy to look at this war as a game of some kind, where we are rooting for Ukraine. It is no game, especially for those actively participating.
 
It is also very disheartening to see corruption scandals in Ukraine when the nation is fighting for its life. Zelenskyy doesn't deserve this. It takes a special kind of person to betray the trust of his fellow citizens under those conditions. It is even worse to undermine the legitimacy of a government that is dealing with an existential war while receiving wavering international support and unwillingness on the part of younger people to fight. Indeed, this war is being fought on Ukraine's side by people that wouldn't normally be accepted for combat duty in the US Army.

[BostonCard]

Agree, corruption is corrosive under the best of circumstances; in times of war it is as destructive a the enemy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/13/ukr...on-russia/

The scandal hits uncomfortably close to Zelensky, and is compounded by his ill advised attempt to neuter the anti-corruption organizations this summer.  He's saying the right things about prosecuting corrupt officials no matter how close they are to his orbit.  I hope he was not involved, as the president of country at wartime has to be beyond reproach.

BC

[BostonCard]

Agree, corruption is corrosive under the best of circumstances; in times of war it is as destructive a the enemy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/13/ukr...on-russia/

The scandal hits uncomfortably close to Zelensky, and is compounded by his ill advised attempt to neuter the anti-corruption organizations this summer.  He's saying the right things about prosecuting corrupt officials no matter how close they are to his orbit.  I hope he was not involved, as the president of country at wartime has to be beyond reproach.

BC

[Goose]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrkg3gx6d6o
https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/21/europe/uk...lysis-intl

Still IMO too early to tell where the administration will "land" on this "peace proposal". The negotiators ostensibly replied to questions about European opinion with "We don't care what the Europeans think." I am hoping that cooler heads in the administration do not share that evaluation and will make it clear to the president that the Europeans do not think the plan is viable and will continue supporting Ukraine. IMO Zelenskyy has so many domestic political fires burning that no way he could agree to any peace plan giving up land Russia has not already captured and remain in power. The "lease" work-around may technically allow Zelenskyy to give up territory, but politically that isn't at all the case.

[Goose]

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czrkg3gx6d6o
https://www.cnn.com/2025/11/21/europe/uk...lysis-intl

Still IMO too early to tell where the administration will "land" on this "peace proposal". The negotiators ostensibly replied to questions about European opinion with "We don't care what the Europeans think." I am hoping that cooler heads in the administration do not share that evaluation and will make it clear to the president that the Europeans do not think the plan is viable and will continue supporting Ukraine. IMO Zelenskyy has so many domestic political fires burning that no way he could agree to any peace plan giving up land Russia has not already captured and remain in power. The "lease" work-around may technically allow Zelenskyy to give up territory, but politically that isn't at all the case.

[BostonCard]

We have much more leverage over Ukraine than over Russia, and to the extent the administration is determined to get a deal done they are definitely using that leverage.  I have opinions beyond that probably run afoul of the Terry rule.

BC

[BostonCard]

We have much more leverage over Ukraine than over Russia, and to the extent the administration is determined to get a deal done they are definitely using that leverage.  I have opinions beyond that probably run afoul of the Terry rule.

BC

[M T]

I was just thinking that we no longer see polls about what the US public thinks of this war.   Take that absence for what it is worth. 

I found one poll from a few months back but I don’t know whether it is legit.

[M T]

I was just thinking that we no longer see polls about what the US public thinks of this war.   Take that absence for what it is worth. 

I found one poll from a few months back but I don’t know whether it is legit.

[fullmetal]

Thanks for the analysis Goose.  I'm still reading updates on the war in my Twitter feed, and it's been a slow buildup of dread lately.

[fullmetal]

Thanks for the analysis Goose.  I'm still reading updates on the war in my Twitter feed, and it's been a slow buildup of dread lately.

[MV72018]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

[MV72018]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

[dabigv13]

We just have to hope this goes like the mineral deal did, and I think there is some reason to hope that it will. In questioning today, Trump said no, this wouldn't be his final offer to Ukraine. It seems he is not necessarily pushing this as hard as some others in the administration. Good tsar, bad boyars?

[dabigv13]

We just have to hope this goes like the mineral deal did, and I think there is some reason to hope that it will. In questioning today, Trump said no, this wouldn't be his final offer to Ukraine. It seems he is not necessarily pushing this as hard as some others in the administration. Good tsar, bad boyars?

[Nan3cy]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

This.

[Nan3cy]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

This.

[dabigv13]

Interesting development-

BREAKING: After talking to 
@SecRubio
, 
@SenatorRounds
 announces that the 28 point plan was a Russian document, not a US document. 

Full 
@SenatorRounds
: "
@SecRubio
 did make a phone call to us this afternoon. I think he made it very clear to us that we are the recipients of a proposal that was delivered to one of our representatives. It is not our recommendation, it is not our peace plan. It is a proposal that was received. And as an intermediary, we have made arrangements to share it. And we did not release it. It was leaked. It was not released by our members or our representatives... This is an opportunity to receive it and that it has been utilized and delivered to the Ukrainians, and that they will have an opportunity to respond. And in doing so, you now have one side being presented and the opportunity for the other side to respond."

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1992359070435582150

[dabigv13]

Interesting development-

BREAKING: After talking to 
@SecRubio
, 
@SenatorRounds
 announces that the 28 point plan was a Russian document, not a US document. 

Full 
@SenatorRounds
: "
@SecRubio
 did make a phone call to us this afternoon. I think he made it very clear to us that we are the recipients of a proposal that was delivered to one of our representatives. It is not our recommendation, it is not our peace plan. It is a proposal that was received. And as an intermediary, we have made arrangements to share it. And we did not release it. It was leaked. It was not released by our members or our representatives... This is an opportunity to receive it and that it has been utilized and delivered to the Ukrainians, and that they will have an opportunity to respond. And in doing so, you now have one side being presented and the opportunity for the other side to respond."

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1992359070435582150

[Goose]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

This.

While it is tempting to simply flat out agree with both of you, I can't quite do that. Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary in international relations to say things that are not true and do things that are repugnant. An example would be the US allying itself with the Soviet Union during WW II and praising Stalin. This type of action is justified by the "greater good" it performs in accomplishing the US policy goals in that situation (or so the argument goes).
 
Of course, that justification can only applies to a situation where there ARE policy goals. It is unclear that the current administration has well-defined goals in this war. When the president was campaigning he appeared to desire the US policy to simply be get out of Ukraine. It was "not our war" and he was indifferent to the final state resulting from the resolution of the conflict.  He was going to terminate all US aid of whatever type. He was going to end the war in 24 hours. To his credit, then and now, he professed concern about the death/injury toll in both Russia and Ukraine. However, the president didn't do this. It initially appeared he would, but he stopped short.
 
We can only theorize why. My personal belief is that there are people (like Witkoff and Hegseth) who want him to do exactly what he said he intended to do. These people also believe that the European states that oppose a complete US withdrawal of aid are "gnats that in the end will do exactly as we tell them because we are the strongest country in the world". There are others (like Rubio) that are definitely concerned with the optics of any such actions and the chaos of a Russian occupation of Ukraine. There are GOP senators that want the US to "defeat" Russia through sanctions and aid to Ukraine. There is also the American public in general.
 
IMO the president is trying to figure out what he can get away with while keeping all these groups at least adequately pacified. The president also wants to win a Nobel Peace Prize. His desired end state is the US and Russia engaging in normal trade relations with no sanctions. He doesn't care about the outcome in Ukraine and doesn't think Russia succeeding in seizing it is in any way significant. For some unknown reasons he believes Russia as a trading partner matters. Of course, it doesn't. Our trade with them (in both directions) was always minimal. Perhaps it has to do with the president's belief that his superior deal-making ability will allow the US (and him personally) to profit from Russian trade. Who knows?
 
The president often keeps his "policy aims" close to the vest. While in business negotiations that can be an advantage, doing so with regard to international relationships and "war aims" has the potential to create a situation where the disparate groups involved work at cross-purposes to each other, possibly rendering success by any one of them impossible. It also convinces the world the US has no clue what it is doing, and leaves the American people unable to decide whether they agree with the president's goals, since they have never been stated. All in all, not good IMO.
 
To be fair, the previous administration was quite unclear about its policy aims and desired end state. The president pronounced that "The US would support Ukraine for as long as it takes." However, that is not a goal. That is a method to attain some unfortunately unstated goal. If the desired result was Russia leaving Ukraine and ending the war, how was the US "support" going to make that happen? If the intent was that Russia would eventually agree to do so "on their own", what happens if they don't? If the tolerable set of end end states were something else, what were they? None of that was articulated. Once again the US was taking actions without any means of deciding if the actions could accomplish our goals.
 

Interesting development-

BREAKING: After talking to 
@SecRubio
, 
@SenatorRounds
 announces that the 28 point plan was a Russian document, not a US document. 

Full 
@SenatorRounds
: "
@SecRubio
 did make a phone call to us this afternoon. I think he made it very clear to us that we are the recipients of a proposal that was delivered to one of our representatives. It is not our recommendation, it is not our peace plan. It is a proposal that was received. And as an intermediary, we have made arrangements to share it. And we did not release it. It was leaked. It was not released by our members or our representatives... This is an opportunity to receive it and that it has been utilized and delivered to the Ukrainians, and that they will have an opportunity to respond. And in doing so, you now have one side being presented and the opportunity for the other side to respond."

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1992359070435582150

Several days later it is still unclear what the state of play within the administration actually is. The president has said apparently contradictory things. Who knows what the outcome will be?

[Goose]

Re the 28-point capitulation plan attributed to Trump's golfing bud Steve Witkoff (who thinks Putin's a "good guy") and Putin's representative Kirill Demitriev: rewarding a brutal aggressor and relentlessly punishing its weaker victim is ethically bankrupt and an embarrassment of epic proportions to the USA.

This.

While it is tempting to simply flat out agree with both of you, I can't quite do that. Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary in international relations to say things that are not true and do things that are repugnant. An example would be the US allying itself with the Soviet Union during WW II and praising Stalin. This type of action is justified by the "greater good" it performs in accomplishing the US policy goals in that situation (or so the argument goes).
 
Of course, that justification can only applies to a situation where there ARE policy goals. It is unclear that the current administration has well-defined goals in this war. When the president was campaigning he appeared to desire the US policy to simply be get out of Ukraine. It was "not our war" and he was indifferent to the final state resulting from the resolution of the conflict.  He was going to terminate all US aid of whatever type. He was going to end the war in 24 hours. To his credit, then and now, he professed concern about the death/injury toll in both Russia and Ukraine. However, the president didn't do this. It initially appeared he would, but he stopped short.
 
We can only theorize why. My personal belief is that there are people (like Witkoff and Hegseth) who want him to do exactly what he said he intended to do. These people also believe that the European states that oppose a complete US withdrawal of aid are "gnats that in the end will do exactly as we tell them because we are the strongest country in the world". There are others (like Rubio) that are definitely concerned with the optics of any such actions and the chaos of a Russian occupation of Ukraine. There are GOP senators that want the US to "defeat" Russia through sanctions and aid to Ukraine. There is also the American public in general.
 
IMO the president is trying to figure out what he can get away with while keeping all these groups at least adequately pacified. The president also wants to win a Nobel Peace Prize. His desired end state is the US and Russia engaging in normal trade relations with no sanctions. He doesn't care about the outcome in Ukraine and doesn't think Russia succeeding in seizing it is in any way significant. For some unknown reasons he believes Russia as a trading partner matters. Of course, it doesn't. Our trade with them (in both directions) was always minimal. Perhaps it has to do with the president's belief that his superior deal-making ability will allow the US (and him personally) to profit from Russian trade. Who knows?
 
The president often keeps his "policy aims" close to the vest. While in business negotiations that can be an advantage, doing so with regard to international relationships and "war aims" has the potential to create a situation where the disparate groups involved work at cross-purposes to each other, possibly rendering success by any one of them impossible. It also convinces the world the US has no clue what it is doing, and leaves the American people unable to decide whether they agree with the president's goals, since they have never been stated. All in all, not good IMO.
 
To be fair, the previous administration was quite unclear about its policy aims and desired end state. The president pronounced that "The US would support Ukraine for as long as it takes." However, that is not a goal. That is a method to attain some unfortunately unstated goal. If the desired result was Russia leaving Ukraine and ending the war, how was the US "support" going to make that happen? If the intent was that Russia would eventually agree to do so "on their own", what happens if they don't? If the tolerable set of end end states were something else, what were they? None of that was articulated. Once again the US was taking actions without any means of deciding if the actions could accomplish our goals.
 

Interesting development-

BREAKING: After talking to 
@SecRubio
, 
@SenatorRounds
 announces that the 28 point plan was a Russian document, not a US document. 

Full 
@SenatorRounds
: "
@SecRubio
 did make a phone call to us this afternoon. I think he made it very clear to us that we are the recipients of a proposal that was delivered to one of our representatives. It is not our recommendation, it is not our peace plan. It is a proposal that was received. And as an intermediary, we have made arrangements to share it. And we did not release it. It was leaked. It was not released by our members or our representatives... This is an opportunity to receive it and that it has been utilized and delivered to the Ukrainians, and that they will have an opportunity to respond. And in doing so, you now have one side being presented and the opportunity for the other side to respond."

https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1992359070435582150

Several days later it is still unclear what the state of play within the administration actually is. The president has said apparently contradictory things. Who knows what the outcome will be?

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine...?st=Xv3cup

A little bit of a breakdown of how the plan came to be.  Whether it was an “American” or “Russian” plan, it certainly had a lot of Russian influence.

I think this administration wants to get a peace deal done, but doesn’t care much about the details. While I am not particularly sympathetic to the administration, and given prior Russian actions I don’t really trust a “peace deal” with Russia, there is something to be said to getting the fighting stopped, and then worrying about how you get the fighting not to start again.  That seems to be what the administration did with the Gaza war.  The difference between the Gaza war and the war in Ukraine is that the US had leverage over Israel and was willing to use it, and had Middle Eastern allies who had leverage over Hamas.  I don’t think anyone really has leverage over Russia, and barring a major setback, Russia only seems to be willing to engage in a cease fire on its own terms.

BC

[BostonCard]

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine...?st=Xv3cup

A little bit of a breakdown of how the plan came to be.  Whether it was an “American” or “Russian” plan, it certainly had a lot of Russian influence.

I think this administration wants to get a peace deal done, but doesn’t care much about the details. While I am not particularly sympathetic to the administration, and given prior Russian actions I don’t really trust a “peace deal” with Russia, there is something to be said to getting the fighting stopped, and then worrying about how you get the fighting not to start again.  That seems to be what the administration did with the Gaza war.  The difference between the Gaza war and the war in Ukraine is that the US had leverage over Israel and was willing to use it, and had Middle Eastern allies who had leverage over Hamas.  I don’t think anyone really has leverage over Russia, and barring a major setback, Russia only seems to be willing to engage in a cease fire on its own terms.

BC