Russia also attempted to infiltrate troops through the inevitable weak spots in the Ukrainian defense. There are areas in Ukraine that have less than 10 Ukrainian troops per km. Even in more densely defended areas there are "seams" that can be exploited. Drones are essential in Ukraine's plans to "cover" all these weak spots. The drones can see the infiltrators coming and Ukraine can dispatch troops to "fill the hole" and meet them (if Ukraine has troops to send that are close enough to perform the task).
The question now is will Ukraine be able to keep fighting long enough for these actions to economically force Russia out of the war, and even if they can, will the administration let them? Make no mistake. If the administration removes all US sanctions on Russia and stops helping Ukraine's war effort, particularly with respect to intelligence support, it is very improbable Ukraine can long continue, let alone prevail.
The Russian strategy and continuing attacks put lots of stress on the Ukrainian infantry personnel. While the Russians had disproportionately larger casualties, they could afford the losses. However, Ukraine felt they were doing pretty well. Ref-8 (17 Sept) discusses Ukraine's successes against the "summer offensive" while claiming Russia was preparing two more major offensives. However Ref-9 (also 17 Sept) asserted Russia was "too weak" to begin a major offensive. That assertion was not buttressed by any details however.
Slightly over a month later, the situation looked quite different. Putin might have been wise to not begin a major summer offensive because the continued single fixed Schwerpunkt was starting to have major effects. While Ref-10 expresses optimism regarding Ukraine's position, it also says
Quote:Ukraine is fighting a war of attrition. Any hopes that might have been raised by President Trump’s red-carpet diplomacy with Vladimir Putin have expired, and it is impossible to spend more than a few minutes near the front line without being confronted by Ukraine’s greatest vulnerability: lack of soldiers.
Quote:All of the officers I met with, during a week in northeastern Ukraine, told me that the key to keeping the Russians at bay lies in finding better ways to compensate for Ukraine’s desperate shortage of manpower.Indeed this is seriously bad news given that this offensive is the only "serious" Russian offensive and not a "full-blooded" one at that. Even more seriously:
Quote:“Our main purpose is to not let direct contact happen, so Ukrainian troops don’t have to engage,” one local commander told me.
The obvious problem with that approach is that Russia is going to continue to put pressure on Ukraine in at least Donbas, if not elsewhere. If Ukraine is unable/unwilling to fight an infantry battle its only alternative is a Fabian strategy. That is possible only if 1) Your troops are mobile enough not to get "fixed" in a position, 2) You can afford to give up the objectives the enemy is attempting to capture, and 3) You are politically supported in doing so. Definitely 2 and 3 are not on offer in Donbas, and 1 is questionable as well. Ref-11 (11 Oct) is generally upbeat, but does contain some really "interesting" information:
A: Look, soon there will be no leaves on the trees. They would all have fallen and without leaves, it’s almost impossible to use these small groups of enemies on foot because we will simply see them. But the enemy keeps learning. Every time the enemy uses new tactics.
Q: Talk about Russian armor. How are the Russians massing it?
A: We don’t see that the enemy is using tanks really often. Instead, they are using armored vehicles and small groups of assault troops who go just by foot or motorcycle. The enemy uses tanks and armored vehicles in order to make a hole in Ukrainian defense lines. After they make this hole, they throw infantry on regular vehicles or motorcycles. So their tactic is that first they advance with a tank and this is a special tank. It has radio electronic warfare and some special anti-mine equipment.
After the tank, they have armored vehicles for infantrymen. Usually, before the tank, they can send several motorcycles to clear the road of mines. We call this a tank fist. So when this tank fist makes a hole in the Ukrainian defenses, Russian infantry use either motorcycles or light vehicles like buggies. Nowadays, this is the enemy’s most common assault tactic. But we should say the enemy uses the meat grinder still. Every single day, the Russian army loses hundreds of people by sending them either on foot or on motorcycles. This is the meat grinder. The infiltration tactics are more difficult when the leaves are off the trees. Yet we know these tactics are being quite damaging to Ukraine. Sounds like wishful thinking. We also see Russia mounting attacks with mechanized infantry in APCs again. While not "conventional", their approach apparently is working to some degree.
Quote:Q: Any other major changes in battlefield tactics by either side?
A: Look, soon there will be no leaves on the trees. They would all have fallen and without leaves, it’s almost impossible to use these small groups of enemies on foot because we will simply see them. But the enemy keeps learning. Every time the enemy uses new tactics.
Q: Talk about Russian armor. How are the Russians massing it?
A: We don’t see that the enemy is using tanks really often. Instead, they are using armored vehicles and small groups of assault troops who go just by foot or motorcycle. The enemy uses tanks and armored vehicles in order to make a hole in Ukrainian defense lines. After they make this hole, they throw infantry on regular vehicles or motorcycles. So their tactic is that first they advance with a tank and this is a special tank. It has radio electronic warfare and some special anti-mine equipment.
After the tank, they have armored vehicles for infantrymen. Usually, before the tank, they can send several motorcycles to clear the road of mines. We call this a tank fist. So when this tank fist makes a hole in the Ukrainian defenses, Russian infantry use either motorcycles or light vehicles like buggies. Nowadays, this is the enemy’s most common assault tactic. But we should say the enemy uses the meat grinder still. Every single day, the Russian army loses hundreds of people by sending them either on foot or on motorcycles. This is the meat grinder. The infiltration tactics are more difficult when the leaves are off the trees. Yet we know these tactics are being quite damaging to Ukraine. Sounds like wishful thinking. We also see Russia mounting attacks with mechanized infantry in APCs again. While not "conventional", their approach apparently is working to some degree.
A month later Ref-12 (10 Nov) effectively admits that Ukraine no longer can remain in Pokrovsk. It can no longer be supplied. While officially the battle isn't over, in reality it is. I previously posted about the state of play on this date (Post) and will not repeat it here. Ref-13 (11 Nov) details a Ukrainian withdrawal on another front. While bad for morale, it was probably necessary. Unfortunately the current trend indicates the personnel shortage is really being felt.
As we know, infiltrators had a big role in the recent setbacks in Donbas. However, the biggest takeaway IMO is that the fact FPV drones lack an all-weather capability is a very critical disadvantage. Russia took great advantage of the onset of bad weather to move troops to contact while Ukraine couldn't see them. Once the Russian troops get into the village/urban area Ukraine is defending drones lose a lot of their advantages. Buildings obscure nearby areas. The drone actually has to go to the next block. It can't see nearly as far as it can in open ground. There is lots more bad weather ahead in Ukraine. The next three months may see a big increase in Russian operations, not the usual winter shutdown. They already have the troops. They don't need to wait for this year's class to get trained. Ukraine also lacks adequate numbers of infrared/low-light capable drones to operate on cloudy/moonless nights. The Bear has learned.
Right now Ukraine is suffering from a triple whammy. In increasing order of severity 1) setbacks on the battlefield forcing retreats, some of them significant, 2) increasing missile and drone attacks on civilian infrastructure aimed at freezing civilians this winter, and 3) the US administration negotiating a peace deal that is almost certainly not acceptable to Ukraine. The battlefield setbacks may have increased the probability that the US administration may throw Ukraine under the bus after all, making Putin's strategy look even better. Lots of the "information" in the press is speculative, so we don't know if such a peace deal actually exists, if the administration actually intends to agree to it, and what Ukraine may do in response.
Ukraine has inflicted significant damage on Russian POL structure. In addition the US/EU secondary sanctions has had a big effect on Russian POL deliveries across the board. The effects in India and China are significant. These sanctions probably were only possible because the price of oil is low and the supply is high. Not too many nations are harmed by not buying Russian oil under current circumstances.
The administration's tariffs on India were ineffective. The reason was that the tariffs exempted pharmaceuticals and electronics. These are two of the main Indian exports to the US by value. The other big one is gems, precious metals, and jewelry. The prices for these goods have skyrocketed, so India can sell domestically what the US would "normally" have taken at a very good price. Thus, all the administration's tariffs accomplished was to anger Modi.
The question now is will Ukraine be able to keep fighting long enough for these actions to economically force Russia out of the war, and even if they can, will the administration let them? Make no mistake. If the administration removes all US sanctions on Russia and stops helping Ukraine's war effort, particularly with respect to intelligence support, it is very improbable Ukraine can long continue, let alone prevail.